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I. INTRODUCTION 
In 2017, the Minnesota Legislature enacted statute section 171.177, 
which required blood and urine tests to determine blood alcohol 
concentrations be supported by a valid search warrant.1 Under this statute, 
drivers subjected to a warranted chemical test may lawfully refuse to submit 
fluid samples and thwart the administration of the chemical test. Thus, 
drivers suspected of DWI must decide whether they will comply with the 
search warrant and submit a fluid sample that may adversely affect their 
interests in subsequent criminal proceedings or, alternatively, exercise the 
lawful option of refusal. Despite this critical and binding decision, in State 
v. Rosenbush, the Minnesota Supreme Court refused to extend Minnesota’s 
Constitutional limited right to counsel to warranted chemical tests.2 The 
                                                           
1 2017 Minn. Laws, ch. 83, art. 2, § 10 (effective July 1, 2017); MINN. STAT. 171.177 (2019).  
2 931 N.W.2d 91 (Minn. 2019).  
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Court’s decision rendered irrelevant, in effect, its previous holding in 
Friedman v. Commissioner of Public Safety3 recognizing a state 
constitutional limited right to counsel before deciding whether to submit to 
chemical testing pursuant to Minnesota’s implied consent law.4 
This note first reviews the history of implied consent laws, with a 
particular focus on Minnesota’s implied consent law.5 Next, it reviews the 
history and objectives behind the protection of the right to counsel under 
both the United States’ and Minnesota’s Constitutions.6 It then provides a 
synopsis of State v. Rosenbush7 by considering the holding and reasoning 
employed by the Minnesota Court of Appeals,8 the Minnesota Supreme 
Court,9 and the Minnesota Supreme Court’s dissenting opinion.10 Lastly, it 
concludes that the statute at issue in Rosenbush is flawed and explores how 
the Minnesota Supreme Court’s reasoning fails to adequately support its 
holding.11  
This note suggests that the reasoning behind the Minnesota Supreme 
Court’s decision in State v. Rosenbush is inconsistent with precedent. 
Rosenbush frustrates the general principles of the limited right to counsel 
recognized in Friedman by denying a driver suspected of DWI access to 
counsel prior to the deciding whether he or she will submit to the warranted 
blood or urine test. Additionally, this note suggests that Minnesota Statute 
section 171.177 is generally inconsistent with the search warrant 
requirement insofar as it affords drivers the legal option to decline a 
warranted test. These inconsistencies produce a new, unique decision 
presented to drivers and create additional problems with regards to 
Minnesota’s limited right to counsel.  
                                                           
3 473 N.W.2d 828 (Minn. 1991).  
4 Id. at 835. In Friedman, the court recognized a “limited” right to counsel because the 
“exercise of this right cannot ‘unreasonably delay the administration of the test.’” Rosenbush, 
931 N.W.2d at 96 n.4 (quoting Prideaux v. State, 310 Minn. 405, 421, 247 N.W.2d 385, 
394 (1976)).  
5 See infra Part II(a).  
6 See infra Part II(b).  
7 931 N.W.2d 91 (Minn. 2019).  
8 See infra Part III(b).  
9 See infra Part III(c). 
10 See infra Part III.  
11 See infra Part IV.  
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A. Minnesota’s Implied Consent Law  
In 1911, the Minnesota Legislature first recognized the dangers of 
drunk driving and made “driving while in an intoxicated condition” 
(“DWI”) a misdemeanor.12 At that time, law enforcement’s only tool for 
determining whether a driver was under the influence of alcohol was his 
own observations, similar to today’s field sobriety tests.13 In 1954, the 
Breathalyzer was developed, which allowed law enforcement to estimate a 
driver’s blood alcohol concentration using chemical oxidation and 
photometry to measure alcohol vapors in a person’s breath.14 Until the late 
1960s, most American courts were lenient with DWI prosecutions and 
generally would not prosecute a driver for DWI unless his or her blood 
alcohol concentration was above 0.15.15  
                                                           
12 OFFICE OF TRAFFIC SAFETY, MINN. DEP’T OF PUB. SAFETY, MINNESOTA IMPAIRED 
DRIVING FACTS, 50 (2017). Today, a person’s first DWI offense with a BAC under 0.18 
constitutes a misdemeanor. A person’s first DWI offense with a BAC over 0.18 is punished 
as a gross misdemeanor. Four or more DWI offenses constitutes a felony. See id. at 60, 63. 
13 History of the Breathalyzer, GUARDIAN INTERLOCK (Dec. 16, 2014), 
https://guardianinterlock.com/blog/history–breathalyzer/ [https://perma.cc/J7ZH–4YYG] 
(officers looked for bloodshot eyes, the smell of alcohol, and whether the driver could walk 
in a straight line or touch his or her nose—much like today’s field sobriety tests).  
14 Douglas Martin, Robert F. Borkenstein, 89, Inventor of the Breathalyzer, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 
17, 2002) https://www.nytimes.com/2002/08/17/us/robert–f–borkenstein–89–inventor–of–
the–breathalyzer.html [https://perma.cc/JC6S-E74C]; see also Wayne A. Morris, A New 
Look at Breath Alcohol Testing, 33 CHAMPION 44 (2009).   
15 See Robert B. Voas, Tara Kelley-Baker, Eduardo Romano & Radha Vishnuvajjala, 
Implied-Consent Laws: A Review of the Literature and Examination of Current Problems 
and Related Statutes, 40 J SAFETY RES. 1, 2 (2009); Matt Novak, Drunk Driving and the Pre–
History of Breathalyzers, GIZMODO (Dec. 31, 2013), 
https://paleofuture.gizmodo.com/drunk–driving–and–the–pre–history–of–breathalyzers–
1474504117 [https://perma.cc/7KAJ–2N2M]. Most legislatures implemented blood alcohol 
concentration standards based on guidelines determined by a 1938 study by the National 
Safety Council and the American Medical Association. Id. A special committee of the 
American Medical Association (Committee to Study Problems of Motor Vehicle Accidents) 
established the following chemical standards for the legal interpretation of ‘under the 
influence of alcohol’: 
Below 0.05 percent alcohol in the blood: no influence of alcohol within the meaning of the 
law.  
Between 0.05 and 0.15 percent, a liberal, wide zone: alcoholic influence usually is present, 
but courts of law are advised to consider the behavior of the individual and circumstances 
leading to the arrest in making their decision.  
0.15 percent: definite evidence of under the influence, since every individual with this 
concentration would have lost a measurable extent some of the clearness of intellect and 
control of himself that he would normally.  
3
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 Starting in 1968, Americans began to understand the dangers of 
drunk driving. A study conducted by the U.S. Department of 
Transportation found that almost half of the nation’s automobile fatalities 
involved alcohol.16 However, the real change occurred in 1980 with the 
emergence of social activists groups.17 Following the killing of her 13-year-
old daughter by a drunk driver, Candy Lightner founded Mothers Against 
Drunk Driving (“MADD”).18 MADD’s mission was to advocate for stricter 
DWI laws and to stigmatize drunk driving.19 Eventually, American society 
began vilifying drunk drivers.20  
Compelled by the social interest to protect Americans against drunk 
drivers, lawmakers strengthened drinking and driving laws.21 In an effort to 
control the persistent concern of drunk driving, all fifty states today have 
enacted implied consent statutes based on the principle that driving is a 
privilege and not a right.22 These laws specify that persons operating a motor 
vehicle agree to submit to chemical tests of breath, blood, or urine to 
determine alcohol or drug content.23 These statutes are utilized to serve the 
legitimate public policy of convicting drunk drivers, but the constitutionality 
of these statutes has been challenged.24  
                                                           
NAT’L SAFETY COUNCIL, A HISTORY OF THE COMMITTEE ON ALCOHOL AND OTHER 
DRUGS 8 (2004), 
https://www.nsc.org/Portals/0/Documents/NSCDocuments_Advocacy/NSChistoryofCAO
D.pdf [https://perma.cc/XV64-ZNDW] (formatting modified from the original). 
16 U.S. DEPT. OF TRANSP., 90TH CONG., 1968 ALCOHOL AND HIGHWAY SAFETY REPORT 1 
(COMM. PRINT 1968).  
17 Voas, Kelley-Baker, Romano & Vishnuvajjala, supra note 15, at 3.  
18 First Drunk Driving Arrest, HISTORY (Nov. 24, 2009), https://www.history.com/this-day-in-
history/first-drunk-driving-arrest [https://perma.cc/93C9-BAFM]. 
19 See id.  
20 Adam K. Raymond, A Brief History of Drunk Driving, THE FIX (Nov. 23, 2011), 
https://www.thefix.com/content/brief-history-drunk-driving-dui-laws-thanksgiving7007 
[https://perma.cc/K8YJ-6A87]. 
21 See Kelsey P. Black, Undue Protection Versus Undue Punishment: Examining the 
Drinking and Driving Problem Across the United States, 40 SUFFOLK U. L. Rev. 463, 465 
(2007). 
22 Cheryl F. Hiemstra, Keeping DUI Implied Consent Laws Implied, 48 WILLAMETTE L. 
REV. 521, 523–24, n.7, 534 (2012); Voas, Kelley-Baker, Romano & Vishnuvajjala, supra note 
15, at 3.  
23 Tina Wescott Cafaro, Fixing the Fatal Flaws in OUI Implied Consent Laws, 34 J. LEGIS. 
99, 102 (2008) (“An implied consent statute’s ‘central feature is that any person who drives 
on the public highways is deemed to have consented to a chemical test to determine the 
alcohol or drug content of the person’s blood.’”) (citing Hinnah v. Dir. of Revenue, 77 
S.W.3d 616, 619 (Mo. 2002)).  
24 See, e.g., Birchfield v. State, 136 S. Ct. 2160 (2016); People v. Gaede, 20 N.E.3d 1266 (Ill. 
App. Ct. 2014); Schutt v. MacDuff, 127 N.Y.S.2d 116 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1954). 
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1. Evolution of Implied Consent Laws in Minnesota  
In 1961, Minnesota enacted its first civil implied consent law.25 
Pursuant to this law, any person driving a vehicle in Minnesota impliedly 
consents to a blood alcohol concentration test if the requesting officer has 
probable cause to suspect impairment.26 At that time, chemical testing 
refusal was subject to automatic license revocation for a period of six 
months.27 The first case to recognize the application of the right to counsel 
when a driver is requested to undergo blood alcohol concentration testing 
was Prideaux v. Department of Public Safety.28 
The Minnesota Legislature amended the implied consent law in 1978, 
following the Minnesota Supreme Court’s decision in Prideaux, which 
afforded drivers a statutory right to consult with counsel before submitting 
to chemical testing.29 The amendments developed the Implied Consent 
Advisory by obliging law enforcement to inform suspected drivers that they 
have a limited right to consult with counsel before deciding whether to 
submit to the chemical test, so long as it does not “unreasonably delay 
administration of the test.”30 Simultaneously, the Impaired Driving code was 
amended to provide that “medical or chemical analysis” results determining 
the “amount of alcohol or a controlled substance in the person’s blood, 
breath, or urine” were only admissible as evidence in criminal DWI 
prosecutions if the tests were “taken voluntarily or pursuant to § 169.123.”31 
Thus, chemical test results could only be used against a driver accused of 
DWI if the driver consented to the test or if law enforcement complied with 
                                                           
25 State v. Capelle, 172 N.W.2d 556, 558 (Minn. 1969) (“L. 1961, c. 454, established the so–
called ‘implied consent’ law, codified as § 169.123. . . . [the implied consent statute 
establishes] the driver of a vehicle is given an option of consenting to a blood, urine, or breath 
test, or having his driver’s license revoked for 6 months.”); OFFICE OF TRAFFIC SAFETY, supra 
note 12, at 3. 
26 OFFICE OF TRAFFIC SAFETY, supra note 12, at 3. 
27 FORST LOWERY, MINN. DEP’T OF PUB. SAFETY, DOT HS-806-549, MINNESOTA’S 
DOUBLE BARRELLED IMPLIED CONSENT LAW 27 (Dec. 1983).  
28 310 Minn. 405, 418, 247 N.W.2d 385, 393 (1976). 
29 Id. at 391 (holding that drivers suspected of DWI have a statutory right to counsel before 
deciding whether to submit to chemical testing pursuant to the implied consent law); Nyflot 
v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 369 N.W.2d 512, 515 (Minn. 1985) (“In 1978, the legislature 
signified its agreement with Prideaux by expanding the implied consent advisory.”). The 
previous Implied Consent Advisory only informed drivers that refusal to submit to chemical 
testing would result in automatic license revocation and after submitting to the chemical test, 
the driver could request additional tests administered by a person of his or her choosing. 
MINN. STAT. § 169.123 (1976) (repealed 2000).  
30 1978 Minn. Laws, ch. 727, subdiv. 2(b)(3). 
31 MINN. STAT. 169.121, subdiv.1(a) (repealed 2000).  
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the procedures set out in the applicable implied consent statute, which 
required drivers be informed of their right to consult with an attorney.32 
In 1984, legislative changes were made to the advisory to deny the right 
to counsel prior to testing.33 The modified advisory informed suspected 
drivers that they are required to submit to the chemical testing pursuant to 
Minnesota law and failure to do so would result in license revocation for 
one year.34 Because it no longer afforded drivers a limited right to counsel 
prior to testing, drivers were informed they have a right to counsel only after 
deciding whether to submit to the chemical test.35 Thus, the legislative 
changes to the implied consent law effectively eliminated the previously 
recognized statutory right to counsel. Confirmed by the Minnesota Supreme 
Court’s holding in Nyflot v. Commissioner of Public Safety, Minnesota law 
no longer afforded drivers suspected of DWI the statutory right to counsel 
prior to deciding whether to submit to chemical testing. 36 
This changed once again in 1991 when the Minnesota Supreme Court 
determined that the implied consent statute violates Article 1 section 6 of 
the Minnesota Constitution because it denies a person of their state 
constitutional limited right to counsel.37 In response to the court’s decision, 
the Minnesota Legislature tailored the Implied Consent Advisory to comply 
with the Minnesota Constitution. In doing so, the new advisory required law 
enforcement officers to inform drivers “[a]t the time testing is requested . . 
. that the person has the right to consult with an attorney” before deciding 
                                                           
32 In 1984, the Legislature removed the limiting language from the Impaired Driving Code 
and no longer relied on voluntary consent or the implied consent statute. Minnesota Statute 
section 169A.45, subdivision 1 provides: “[u]pon the trial of any prosecution arising out of 
the acts alleged to have been committed by any person arrested for violating section 169A.20 
[(driving while impaired)] . . . the court may admit evidence of the presence or amount of 
alcohol in the person’s blood, breath, or urine as shown by an analysis of those items.” MINN. 
STAT. §169A.45, subdiv. 1 (2019). 
33 Act of May 2, 1984, ch. 622, § 10, 1984 Minn. Laws 1336 (repealed 1993).  
34 Act of May 2, 1984, ch. 622, § 12, 1984 Minn. Laws 1541, 1546–47 (repealed 1993). The 
civil consequence of license revocation for refusal was increased from six months to one 
year. Id.  
35 Id.  
36 Nyflot v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 369 N.W.2d 512, 515 (Minn. 1985). The Minnesota 
Supreme Court concluded that the legislative changes made to the implied consent statute 
demonstrate its intention to remove the limited right to counsel afforded to drivers. Id. at 
515; see infra Section II(b)(ii)(3).  
37 Friedman v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 473 N.W.2d 828, 833 (Minn. 1991).  
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whether to submit to the test.38 In 2001, the implied consent law was 
recodified as Minnesota Statute sections 169A.50-169A.53.39  
2. Minnesota’s Modern Implied Consent Law  
Collectively, Minnesota Statutes sections 169A.50 to 169A.53 are 
referred to as Minnesota’s “Implied Consent Law.”40 The modern implied 
consent Statute in Minnesota states:   
Any person who drivers, operates, or is in physical control of a 
motor vehicle within this state or on any boundary of water of this 
state consents, subject to the provisions of sections 169A.50 to 
169A.53 (implied consent law), and section 169A.20 (driving 
while impaired), to a chemical test of that person’s blood, breath, 
or urine for the purpose of determining the presence of alcohol, 
a controlled substance or its metabolite, or an intoxicating 
substance.41  
In order for a blood, breath, or urine test to be administered, the 
implied consent statute, in relevant part, requires that it be at the direction 
of a police officer who “has probable cause to believe the person was 
driving, operating, or in physical control of a motor vehicle in violation of 
section 169A.20 (driving while impaired).”42 Before the administration of a 
breath test, Minnesota law requires that drivers be informed that they are 
required by law to take the test, that failure to submit to the test is a crime, 
and that they have a limited right to consult with an attorney.43 Although 
warrantless breath tests are permissible, blood and urine tests can only be 
conducted pursuant to a search warrant or a judicially recognized exception 
to the search warrant requirement.44 
In response to Minnesota and U.S. Supreme Court rulings, the 
legislature enacted Minnesota Statute section 171.177 (license revocation), 
which requires blood and urine tests to be conducted in compliance with 
specified procedures.45 The chemical test advisory, pursuant to Minnesota 
                                                           
38 1993 Minn. Laws, ch. 347, § 10 (codified at MINN. STAT. § 169.123, subdiv. 2(b) (Supp. 
1993)) (repealed 2000).  
39 2000 Minn. Laws, ch. 478, § 7.  
40 MINN. STAT. § 169A.50 (2019).  
41 MINN. STAT. § 169A.51, subdiv. 1 (2019).  
42 Id.   
43 Id. at subdiv. 2.  
44 Id. at subdiv. 3. The breath test advisory informs a driver that they are required to take the 
test pursuant to Minnesota law, refusal to submit to the test is a crime, and they have the 
limited right to counsel. Id. at subdiv. 2. 
45 Id. at subdiv. 3; State v. Rosenbush, 931 N.W.2d 91, 96 (Minn. 2019) (“But in 2017, the 
Legislature amended the implied-consent statutes after several judicial decisions limited the 
7
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Statute section 171.177, only informs drivers that “refusal to submit to a 
blood or urine test is a crime.”46 Despite the nature of implied consent, the 
statute further provides that “[i]f a person refuses to permit a [warranted] 
blood or urine test . . . then a test must not be given.”47 Although law 
enforcement may initially decide whether to administer a blood or urine 
test, the suspected driver must be offered both a blood and urine test and 
subsequently refuse both before the refusal amounts to an actionable 
offense.48  
3. Traffic Stops and Implied Consent Testing Procedures  
The United States and the Minnesota Constitution prohibit 
unreasonable searches and seizures by the government.49 Although a traffic 
stop constitutes a “seizure” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment 
of the Constitution and Article 1 section 10 of Minnesota’s Constitution, 
traffic stops are considered investigative seizures and require lesser 
justifications than custodial seizures.50 In Minnesota, police may conduct a 
limited investigative seizure without a warrant, so long as they have an 
objective particularized articulable suspicion of criminal activity to justify the 
traffic stop.51 Although the standard for justification of traffic stops is 
relatively lenient, the basis of the stop must be established on more than 
“mere whim, caprice, or idle curiosity.”52 In determining whether the factual 
                                                           
ability of police to obtain warrantless blood and urine samples from suspected impaired 
drivers.”). 
46 MINN. STAT. § 171.177, subdiv. 1 (2019).  
47 Id. at subdiv. 13; see also MINN. STAT. § 169A.52, subdiv. 1.  
48 MINN. STAT. § 171.177, subdiv. 2 (2019).  
49 The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides: “The right of people 
to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and 
seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, 
supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and 
the persons or things to be seized.” See also MINN. CONST. art. I, §10.  
50 U.S. CONST. amend. IV; MINN. CONST. art. I, §10. Contra Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 
(1968) (distinguishing an arrest from a limited and investigative search, and applying the 
“reasonable articulable suspicion” standard to the latter); Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 
(1972) (applying the “reasonable articulable suspicion” to motor vehicle stops).   
51 Terry, 392 U.S. at 21–22; State v. Richardson, 622 N.W.2d 823, 825 (Minn. 2001) (when 
determining whether reasonable suspicion exists “consider the totality of the circumstances 
and acknowledge that trained law enforcement officers are permitted to make inferences and 
deductions that would be beyond the competence of an untrained person.”).   
52 Ascher v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 519 N.W.2d 183, 187 (Minn. 1994); see also Alabama 
v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330 (1990) (recognizing that the factual basis required to justify an 
investigative seizure is “obviously less demanding . . . than probable cause.”); State v. Cripps, 
533 N.W.2d 388, 391 (Minn. 1995); State v. Harris, 590 N.W.2d 90, 101 (Minn. 1999) (“A 
8
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basis sufficiently justifies a traffic stop, courts apply the totality of 
circumstances test and may consider the “officer’s experience, general 
knowledge, and observations; background information, including the nature 
of the offense suspected and the time and location of the seizure; and 
anything else that is relevant.”53 Further, during a traffic stop each additional 
intrusion “must be strictly tied to and justified by the circumstances which 
rendered the initiation of the stop permissible.”54 As a guide, the following 
is an overview of the procedural requirements for impairment testing under 
the implied consent law.  
 For a police officer to conduct a lawful traffic stop, he or she must 
first have an objective particularized articulable suspicion of some type of 
criminal activity. Even minor traffic violations justify investigative traffic 
stops, such as speeding, changing lanes without using turn signals, and 
swerving.55 If an officer becomes aware of such conduct, it is likely he or she 
has reasonable suspicion to justify the traffic stop. However, the Minnesota 
Constitution requires that any additional intrusions not closely related to the 
initial justification for the traffic stop be unlawful unless there is independent 
probable cause or reasonableness to justify the subsequent intrusion.56 
 The administration of field sobriety tests and preliminary breath tests 
is an expansion of a traffic stop and must be supported by reasonable 
suspicion of DWI.57 Therefore, if blood alcohol concentration (“BAC”) 
testing is not closely related to the additional stop, the officer must have 
probable cause or reasonable suspicion of DWI before he may lawfully 
initiate impairment testing.58 “An officer needs only one objective indication 
of intoxication to constitute probable cause to believe that a person is under 
                                                           
hunch, without additional objectively articulable facts, cannot provide the basis for an 
investigatory stop.”).  
53 Applegate v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 402 N.W.2d 106, 108 (Minn. 1987).  
54 State v. Askerooth, 681 N.W.2d 353, 364 (Minn. 2004); see also State v. Creviston–Lerud, 
No. A18-0843, 2019 WL 1233551, at *2 (Minn. Ct. App. Mar. 18, 2019) (“The extension 
of a traffic stop does not violate the Minnesota Constitution ‘so long as each incremental 
intrusion during the stop is tied to and justified by one of the following: (1) the original 
legitimate purpose of the stop, (2) independent probable cause, or (3) reasonableness, as 
defined in Terry v. Ohio.’”) (citation omitted)).  
55 State v. George, 557 N.W.2d 575, 578 (Minn. 1997) (“Ordinarily, if an officer observes a 
violation of a traffic law, however insignificant, the officer has an objective basis for stopping 
the vehicle.”); State v. Jones, 649 N.W.2d 481, 484 (Minn. Ct. App. 2002) (upholding traffic 
stop where police observed driver changing lanes without signaling).  
56 MINN. CONST. art. 1, § 10.  
57 Vondrachek v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 906 N.W.2d, 262, 268–69 (Minn. Ct. App. 2017).  
58 State v. Kier, 678 N.W.2d 672, 678 (Minn. Ct. App. 2004) cert. denied (Minn. June 15, 
2004). 
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the influence,” which may include “an odor of alcohol, bloodshot and 
watery eyes, slurred speech, and un uncooperative attitude.”59  
An officer whose intrusions are justified by reasonable suspicion and 
probable cause may then request a preliminary breath test without obtaining 
a warrant, but must first inform a driver that failure to submit to the breath 
test is a crime and that he or she has a limited right to consult with counsel 
before deciding whether to submit to the breath test. On the other hand, an 
officer must obtain a search warrant for a driver’s blood and/or urine before 
he or she can request a driver to submit fluid samples for chemical testing 
purposes. Once the search warrant is obtained, the officer must read the 
driver the fluid-test advisory to inform the driver that failure to submit to the 
warranted-test is a crime.60 At that moment, the driver is faced with a 
decision—either comply with the search warrant and submit fluid samples, 
or refuse to do so and suffer the criminal and civil consequences attached 
to refusal. A driver who refuses to submit to the chemical test suffers the 
legal ramifications of failure to submit and may not know that those 
consequences can be more severe than the penalties attached to a DWI 
conviction. Conversely, a driver may not know they have the legal option to 
refuse to submit and halt administration of the chemical test. Thus, the 
driver might submit to the test, fail, and have the results used as evidence 
against him or her in subsequent criminal proceedings.  
Prior to the Minnesota Supreme Court’s decision in State v. 
Rosenbush and the 2017 legislative amendments, drivers were able to make 
well-informed decisions because they had the right to consult counsel before 
deciding whether to submit. After the Court’s decision, drivers no longer 
have the right to counsel until after deciding, which is arguably too late 
because the driver’s decision is binding at that point. The right to counsel is 
meant to attach at the point an accused needs the assistance of counsel.61 
B. The Right to Counsel 
1. United States Constitutional Right  
The Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides that: 
“in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have 
the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.”62 The central purpose of the 
                                                           
59 Id.   
60 Language has been added and eliminated by the legislature throughout the years. See infra 
Part II. 
61 See infra Part 2(b)(ii).  
62 U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The right to counsel embodied in the Sixth Amendment 
originated from colonial statutes and constitutional provisions deliberately rejecting the 
10
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Sixth Amendment guarantee of counsel was to assure that the accused, when 
“confronted with both the intricacies of the law and the advocacy of the . . . 
prosecutor,” would be given assistance.63 Indispensable to the fair 
administration of our adversarial system, the right to counsel is at the core 
of constitutional criminal procedure.64 As Justice Sutherland explained:   
The right to be heard would be in many cases, of little avail if it 
did not comprehend the right to be heard by counsel. Even the 
intelligent and educated layman has small and sometimes no skill 
in the science of law. . . . He lacks both the skill and knowledge 
adequately to prepare his defense, even though he have a perfect 
one. He requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the 
proceedings against him. Without it, though he be not guilty, he 
faces the danger of conviction because he does not know how to 
establish his innocence.65 
There are two central reasons for the existence of a right to counsel. 
First, the layman requires protection from the complexities of the legal 
system.66 A defendant may be uninformed concerning the legal rights 
granted to him. Thus, he requires the “guidance of one who is trained in the 
law to guard against the involuntary waiver of such rights.”67 Additionally, 
even a defendant who understands his legal rights may “become so 
hopelessly confused in following the different paths of the law that he may 
unintentionally lose the advantages that our accusatorial system of law 
affords him.”68 It is important to recognize that the foundation of the Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel is grounded in a lawyer’s professional role as 
                                                           
English common-law rule, which “severely limited the right of a person accused of a felony 
to consult with counsel at trial.” See United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 306 (1973) (citing 
Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 60 (1932)).  
63 Ash, 413 U.S. at 309.   
64 Akhil R. Amar, Sixth Amendment First Principles, 84 Geo. L.J. 641, 641 (1996) (“The 
Sixth Amendment is the heartland of constitutional criminal procedure.”); Maine v. 
Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 169 (1985) (“[T]he right to counsel safeguards the other rights 
deemed essential for the fair prosecution of a criminal proceeding.”); Ash, 413 U.S. at 307–
8 (The Sixth Amendment has been interpreted “to assure that the ‘guiding hand of counsel’ 
is available to those in need of its assistance.”) (citing Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 
344–345 (1963) and Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 31 (1972)).  
65 Powell v. State of Ala., 287 U.S. 45, 68–69 (1932).  
66 United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264, 292 (1980) (“[T]he concerns underlying the Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel are to provide aid to the layman in arguing the law and in coping 
with intricate legal procedures . . . .”); Felix Rackow, The Right to Counsel –– Time for 
Recognition Under the Due Process Clause, 10 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 216, 226 (1959) 
(“[T]he layman needs protection from the complexities of the legal system under which he 
lives.”).  
67 Rackow, supra note 66, at 226.  
68 Id.  
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a legal expert and strategist.69 Second, the accused layman needs protection 
from fervent prosecutors.70 The right to counsel acts as “a shield by which 
an accused defendant is protected from a vengeful public or overzealous 
police, prosecutors, or judges.”71 Thus, the core purpose of the Sixth 
Amendment right to trial is ensure fairness in the adversarial system by 
providing assistance to the accused confronted with the intricacies of law 
and minimizing the public prosecutor’s substantial advantages.  
Although originally enforceable only in federal courts, the Supreme 
Court recognized the fundamental significance of the right to counsel in 
1963 and made it binding on the states through the Due Process Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment.72 At first, the Court broadly defined “critical 
stage” as the point at which the accused requires counsel’s presence and 
guidance in order to secure later trial rights.73 The Court later clarified the 
application of the right to counsel and held that it applies once a “critical 
stage”74 in the criminal process is reached through the “initiation of judicial 
                                                           
69 Henry, 447 U.S. at 293 (“[T]he theoretical foundation of the Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel is based on the traditional role of an attorney as a legal expert and strategist.”).  
70 Williams v. Kaiser, 323 U.S. 471, 476 (1945) (“A layman is usually no match for the skilled 
prosecutor whom he confronts in the court room. He needs the aid of counsel lest he be the 
victim of overzealous prosecutors, of the law’s complexity, or of his own ignorance or 
bewilderment.”); F. Heller, The Sixth Amendment, 61 YALE L.J. 286 (1951) (“[T]he accused 
in the colonies faced a government official whose specific function it was to prosecute, and 
who was incomparably more familiar than the accused with the problems of procedure, the 
idiosyncrasies of juries, and, last, but not lease, the personnel of the court.”).   
71 Damon J. Keith, Civil Liberties and Criminal Law: Balancing the Rights of the Accused 
with Rights of Society, WASH. POST (Nov. 10, 1977), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/local/1977/11/10/ civil-liberties-and-criminal-law-
balancing-the-rights-of-the-accused-with-rights-of-society/9927e31d-7d8a-4790-af1d-
4e08527875d7/ [https://perma.cc/8FRR-W5S5]; Neil W. Schilke, Right to Counsel – An 
Unrecognized Right, 2 WM. & MARY L. REV. 318, 338–39 (1960) (“Without making any 
claim to generalization, it may be stated as common knowledge that the prosecuting 
technique in the United States is purported so as to regard a conviction as a personal victory 
calculated to enhance the prestige of the prosecutor. . . . This often serves to induce the 
prosecutor, who will later campaign on his conviction record, to unquestioningly assume guilt 
and unrelentingly prosecute the person accused. . . . Prosecutors have justified many illegal 
practices by the “deluded dogma that the end will sanctify the means.”). 
72 See generally Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342 (1963) (describing the right to 
counsel as fundamental and essential).  
73 Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 122 (1975) (describing a critical stage as any stage at which 
“potential substantial prejudice to defendant’s rights inheres” including “pretrial procedures 
that would impair defense on the merits if the accused is required to proceed without 
counsel.”); see also United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 226–27 (1967). 
74 Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 690 (1972) (citing Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 
382–83 (1968)).  
12
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criminal proceedings.”75 Thus, under the United States Constitution, the 
Sixth Amendment right to counsel must be afforded to the accused once 
formal adversarial judicial proceedings commence.76 However, as Justice 
Yetka said, “[a] state is free to offer its citizens greater protection in its 
constitution than is offered by the federal law.”77  
2. Minnesota’s State Constitutional Right to Counsel  
In 1887, the Minnesota legislature first recognized the importance of 
the right to counsel when it enacted a statute guaranteeing that right for 
persons “restrained of liberty.”78 The legislative intent and public policy 
behind this statute reflects Minnesota’s longstanding objective to afford 
persons “an immediate right to communicate with counsel concerning the 
impending proceedings against him.”79 Consistent with the intent and form 
of its predecessor, the statute remains in effect today.80  
Not only is the right to counsel protected by the statute, it is also 
guaranteed by both the state and federal constitution. The Minnesota 
Constitution provides that: “In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall 
enjoy the right . . . to have the assistance of counsel in his defense.”81 Despite 
the compatible language employed in both the Minnesota Constitution and 
the Federal Constitution, the United States Supreme Court’s interpretation 
of the federal provisions are not determinative regarding the state’s 
interpretation of its own state’s provisions.82 Thus, an individual may be 
afforded greater and more expansive protections under its state law than is 
                                                           
75 Kirby, 406 U.S. at 689 (judicial criminal proceedings may include “formal charge, 
preliminary hearing, indictment, information, or arraignment.”).  
76 United States v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180, 187–89 (1984).  
77 Nyflot v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 369 N.W.2d 512, 523 (Minn. 1985) (Yetka, J., dissenting).  
78 1887 Minn. Laws ch. 187, 1. (“All public officers . . . having in custody any person . . . 
restrained of his liberty for any alleged cause whatever, shall, except in cases of imminent 
danger of escape, admit any practicing attorney at law who may have been retained by or in 
behalf of such person so restrained of his liberty, or whom such person may desire to see or 
consult, to see such person and consult with him alone and in private, at the jail or other 
place of custody.”) 
79 Prideaux v. State, Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 247 N.W.2d 385, 393 (Minn. 1976).  
80 MINN. STAT. § 481.10 (2019).  
81 MINN. CONST. art. I, § 6.  
82 State v. Murphy, 380 N.W.2d 766, 773 (Minn. 1986) (Wahl, J., dissenting) (“[W]e are not 
obliged to adopt the United States Supreme Court’s construction of a federal constitutional 
provision in interpreting our own constitution even if the language of a state constitutional 
privilege is identical.”) (citation omitted); Terrence J. Fleming & Jack Nordby, The 
Minnesota Bill of Rights: “Wrapt in the Old Miasmal Mist,” 7 HAMLINE L. REV. 51, 63 
(1984) (“Identical meaning should not be implied merely because there is identical 
language.”).  
13
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offered by the federal law.83 As Chief Judge John R. Tunheim of the United 
States District Court for the District of Minnesota once stated:  
The rebirth of state constitutional law has given states a 
remarkable opportunity to take a step back and examine how 
broadly individual rights should be protected. . . . [T]he 
reemergence of state constitutions presents the State of 
Minnesota with opportunities to interpret its constitution in a 
manner that truly reflects the unique values and interests of 
Minnesotans. Here lies the greatest value of a state constitution—
its ability to react to unique local concerns and conditions.84  
 Although the Sixth Amendment right to counsel does not attach until 
the criminal justice proceedings against an individual have reached a critical 
stage in federal court, state courts are free to determine the appropriate 
point at which criminal proceedings reach a critical stage in the respective 
state’s constitution.85 In Friedman, the Court adopted the United States 
Supreme Court’s broad definition of “critical stage,” meaning “those pretrial 
procedures that would impair defense on the merits if the accused is 
required to proceed without counsel.”86 Despite the consistent terminology, 
the court is not bound to reach the same conclusions as its federal 
counterpart in determining whether a certain event constitutes a critical 
stage.87 In fact, the Minnesota Supreme Court has found that the “critical 
stage” in a criminal proceeding attaches earlier under Minnesota’s 
Constitution than it does under federal law. However, the court has 
struggled with determining whether the limited right to counsel applies at 
the time a test is being administered in DWI cases, which is revealed 
through an examination of four Minnesota Supreme Court cases that 
exemplify the development of qualifying this moment as a “critical stage” 
relative to Minnesota’s DWI proceedings.88 The following cases analyze the 
                                                           
83 Nyflot v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 369 N.W.2d 512, 523 (Minn. 1985) (Yetka, J., dissenting) 
(“A state is free to offer its citizens greater protection in its constitution than is offered by the 
federal law.”).  
84 Hon. John R. Tunheim, Criminal Justice: Expanded Protections Under the Minnesota 
Constitution, 20 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 465, 466 (1994).  
85 Matsakis & Spector, Toward an Activist Role for State Bill of Rights, 8 HARV. C.R.–C.L.L 
REV. 271, 318–19 (1973).  
86 Friedman v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 473 N.W.2d 828, 833 (Minn. 1991); see also Gerstein 
v. Pugh, 429 U.S. 103, 122 (1975).  
87 Friedman, 473 N.W.2d at 833 n.4 (“We approved use of the terms . . . although they arose 
from federal doctrine, as embodying concepts that provided guidance as we examined our 
state constitution. We likewise make use of ‘critical stage’ analysis as we now interpret our 
Minn. Const. art. I, § 6.”).  
88 State v. Palmer, 191 N.W.2d 188 (Minn. 1971) (holding there is no federal constitutional 
right to counsel before deciding whether to submit); Prideaux v. State, Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 
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“critical stage” inquiry under Minnesota’s statutory right to counsel, the 
United States Constitutional right to counsel, and Minnesota’s 
Constitutional limited right to counsel.  
First, in 1971, the Minnesota Supreme Court considered whether a 
critical stage in a criminal proceeding is reached once a driver suspected of 
DWI is requested to submit to chemical testing pursuant to Minnesota’s 
implied consent statute.89 In State v. Palmer, the defendant challenged his 
license revocation on the grounds that he was denied his constitutional right 
to consult with an attorney at the time the chemical tests were requested.90 
The court rejected the defendant’s argument and upheld the revocation of 
his license.91 In reaching its conclusion, the court focused on the civil nature 
of license revocation and found “[t]he defendant, therefore, is not clothed 
with those substantive constitutional rights associated with criminal 
matters.”92 
In 1976, the Minnesota Supreme Court first afforded a driver 
suspected of DWI with the protections of the statutory right to counsel 
before deciding whether to submit to chemical testing is requested of a 
driver suspected of DWI.93 In Prideaux v. Department of Public Safety, the 
court considered the public policy behind the statutory right to counsel – 
“to secure for the person in custody an immediate right to communicate 
with counsel concerning the impending proceedings against him.”94 The 
                                                           
247 N.W.2d 385 (Minn. 1976) (reaffirming no federal constitutional right to counsel, but 
recognizing that there is a state statutory right to counsel before deciding whether to submit 
to chemical testing); Nyflot, 369 N.W.2d at 512 (considering the 1984 legislative changes to 
the implied consent law, the court held that there is neither a  federal constitutional right nor 
state statutory right to counsel); Friedman, 473 N.W.2d at 828 (recognizing a state 
constitutional right to counsel before deciding whether to submit to chemical testing). In 
order to fully understand the limited right to counsel under Minnesota’s Constitution, these 
four cases should be read as a “quartet.” Transcript of Oral Argument, State v. Rosenbush, 
931 N.W.2d 91 (Minn. 2019) (No. A18-0377). 
89 Palmer, 191 N.W.2d at 188. 
90 Id. at 189.  
91 Id. at 191 (“The weight of authority is to the effect that because an administrative 
proceeding for the suspension of a driver’s license is a civil proceeding, and not a criminal 
prosecution, a defendant does not have a constitutional right to consult with an attorney 
before deciding whether to accede to an officer’s request to submit to a blood test.”). 
92 Id. at 190 (“‘[R]evocation of a [driver’s] license is not a punishment but is rather an exercise 
of the police power for the protection of the public.’ . . . ‘A license revocation proceeding is 
civil in nature, notwithstanding the vague language . . . that the judicial hearing ‘shall proceed 
as in a criminal matter.’” (citations omitted)).  
93 Prideaux v. State, Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 247 N.W.2d 385 (Minn. 1976) (effectively, but not 
expressly overturning State v. Palmer which did not recognize a right to counsel before 
submitting to a chemical test).  
94 Id. at 393.  
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court ultimately concluded that the “importance of a driver’s license and the 
binding decisions which must be made by the driver asked to submit to 
chemical testing make the chemical-testing process a ‘proceeding’ within the 
meaning of § 481.10 before which consultation with counsel is to be 
accorded.” 95 Additionally, the court found that the person must be 
informed of this statutory right.96 
Although the court refrained from deciding the constitutional issues 
raised, it acknowledged the meaningful decision that a suspected drunk 
driver must make when confronted with the choice of submitting to 
chemical testing, reasoning that “the driver who is requested to submit to 
chemical testing might not know that he can reasonably refuse the test in 
certain circumstances where the officer did not . . . properly inform the 
driver of his rights, or confused the driver as to his rights.”97 Based on the 
court’s analysis of hypothetical scenarios in which a suspected driver might 
plausibly consider declining chemical testing, it determined that the decision 
is critical and binding.98 The court equated the critical and binding character 
of the decision to submit to chemical testing with the decision to make a 
verbal statement.99  
Furthermore, the court articulated its doubts concerning the validity of 
prior holding—that chemical testing is not a critical stage in a criminal 
proceeding because of the civil nature of the proceeding.100 The Prideaux 
court reasoned that the “civil” label attached to driver’s license revocation 
proceedings is not dispositive where important constitutional rights are 
involved, emphasizing three reasons.101 First, license revocation following the 
failure to submit to chemical testing is “necessarily and inextricably 
intertwined with an undeniably criminal proceeding – namely, prosecution 
for driving while under the influence of an alcoholic beverage.”102 The 
obvious and intended purpose of the implied consent law is to coerce 
                                                           
95 Id. (adding that if the “implied–consent statute forbids a limited right to counsel before 
chemical testing, that statute, which is later and more specific in its scope, would control.”). 
96 Id. at 394 (recognizing that law enforcement must assist in the vindication of the right to 
counsel).  
97 Id. at 390.  
98 Id. (considering situations in which a suspected driver might genuinely prefer refusal of the 
test due to the possibility of decreased criminal convictions and accept the consequences 
resulting from refusal, specifically the six month license revocation).  
99 Id. (citing Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964) and Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 
(1966)).  
100 Id. at 388; see also, e.g., State v. Palmer, 191 N.W.2d 188 (1971) (holding a driver does 
not have a constitutional right to consult with counsel prior to deciding whether to submit to 
a chemical test).  
101 Prideaux, 247 N.W.2d at 388.  
102 Id.  
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drivers suspected of DWI into providing evidence that can be used against 
him in subsequent criminal proceedings.103 Second, the similarity of the 
impact of license revocation and traditional criminal sanctions cannot be 
overlooked.104 Thus, “we cannot allow a ‘civil’ label to obscure the quasi-
criminal consequences of revocation to the ordinary citizen.”105 Lastly, the 
court noted the significance of the decision of whether to take or refuse 
chemical testing, which “is arguably a ‘critical stage’” in DWI proceedings.106 
Although Prideaux was limited to statutory rights, its impact on and 
application to constitutional right to counsel cases cannot go unnoticed.107 
In Nyflot v. Commissioner of Public Safety, the Minnesota Supreme 
Court confronted challenges to the 1984 legislative amendments made to 
the Implied Consent Advisory based on the United States Constitution and 
a Minnesota Statute § 481.10108 After being arrested for DWI, law 
enforcement read Nyflot the implied consent advisory, which in relevant 
part, informed her that “‘after submitting to testing,’ she had the right to 
consult with an attorney.”109 Despite her persistent attempts to contact an 
attorney before deciding, Nyflot eventually refused to submit to the 
chemical testing.110 She was then permitted to contact an attorney, who 
advised her to accede to the officer’s request.111 Despite her eagerness to 
comply after obtaining advice from her attorney, the officer told her she was 
no longer allowed to submit to the test.112 
 Nyflot argued that the legislative changes did not eliminate the 
statutory right to counsel recognized in Prideaux.113 Additionally, if they did, 
such legislation violates the Sixth Amendment Due Process Clause and the 
Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution.114 Disagreeing 
                                                           
103 Id.   
104 Friedman v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 473 N.W.2d 828, 832 (citing Prideaux, 247 N.W.2d 
at 388).  
105 Prideaux, 247 N.W.2d at 389. 
106 Id.   
107 1 MINNESOTA MISDEMEANORS § 17.04 [12][a]. In Commissioner of Public Safety v. 
Campbell, 494 N.W.2d 268 (Minn. 1992), the Minnesota Supreme Court suggested the case 
law established from Prideaux should be followed and relied upon in applying and 
interpreting Friedman. Id.  
108 See generally Nyflot v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety., 369 N.W.2d 512 (Minn. 1985).  
109 Id. at 513–14.  
110 Id. at 514.  
111 Id.  
112 Id.  
113 Id.; see generally Prideaux v. State, Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 247 N.W.2d 385 (Minn. 1976) 
(finding MINN. STAT. § 481.10 provided a statutory right to counsel when a driver is 
confronted with a request to submit to a chemical test).  
114 Nyflot, 369 N.W.2d at 514.   
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with Nyflot and the Minnesota Court of Appeals, the Minnesota Supreme 
Court concluded that the statutory right to counsel does not attach before a 
suspect decides whether to submit to chemical testing.115 The court reasoned 
that “[b]ecause the legislature originally signified its adherence to the 
Prideaux ruling by amending the advisory . . . it makes sense that the 
legislature intended to abandon the Prideaux right to counsel by later 
amending the advisory to remove this right.”116 Thus, the court held that 
Minnesota no longer provides a statutory right to counsel when faced with 
the decision to submit to chemical testing.117  
 The court further held that there is no federal constitutional right to 
counsel when confronted with this decision.118 Although the court 
acknowledged that its decision in Prideaux indicated that such a decision 
sufficed as a “critical stage,” subsequent United States Supreme Court cases 
have since narrowed the definition of “critical stage.”119 Pursuant to federal 
law, the right to counsel does not attach until judicial proceedings are 
formally commenced.120 Therefore, the court held that there is neither a 
state statutory right nor a federal constitutional right to counsel in this 
situation.121  
In Friedman v. Commissioner of Public Safety, the Minnesota 
Supreme Court was asked to determine when Minnesota’s State 
Constitutional right to counsel is triggered in a DWI proceeding.122 The 
court adopted the United States Supreme Court’s definition of what 
constitutes a “critical stage” in a criminal proceeding, which includes “those 
pretrial procedures that would impair defense on the merits if the accused 
is required to proceed without counsel.”123  
                                                           
115 Id. at 517.  
116 Id. at 515. This dissent challenged the majority’s reasoning, recognizing that “[t]his statute 
has never been amended. As counsel for the state admitted, the 1984 legislature was 
presented several proposals to amend section 481.10 to exclude specifically the implied 
consent situation but rejected them all. Today, by limiting the statute’s effect, this court has 
effectively amended the statute without legislative authorization.” Id. at 519–20 (Yetka, J., 
dissenting). 
117 Id. at 515.  
118 Id. at 517.  
119 Id. at 515, 517; accord Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 (1972) (the plurality held that the 
Sixth Amendment right to counsel under the Federal Constitution does not attach until 
judicial proceedings are formally commenced). Subsequent cases have reinforced the 
plurality’s decision. See Nyflot, 369 N.W.2d at 516; United States v. Gourvia, 467 U.S. 180 
(1984); Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454 (1981); Moore v. Illinois, 434 U.S. 220 (1977).  
120 Kirby, 406 U.S. at 688.  
121 Nyflot, 369 N.W.2d at 517.  
122 Friedman v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 473 N.W.2d 828, 830 (Minn. 1991).  
123 Id. at 833 (quoting Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 122 (1975)).  
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Friedman was arrested after failing a preliminary breath test and was 
subsequently arrested for DWI.124 At the police station, Friedman inquired 
about her rights and ability to contact an attorney.125 The officer did not allow 
her to speak with counsel.126 The officer read the Implied Consent Advisory, 
which informed her that her “driver’s license would be revoked for one year 
if she refused chemical testing for blood alcohol, that the refusal or results 
of the test would be used against her at trial, and that she had a right to 
consult an attorney after testing.”127 Although the officer read the advisory 
three times, Friedman did not understand the advisory and was still 
confused about her rights.128 The officer deemed Friedman’s confused 
response a refusal, which led to a one-year license revocation pursuant to 
the statute applicable at the time.129  
Application of the newly adopted definition in the court’s 
interpretation of the Minnesota Constitution led the court to hold that any 
person suspected of DWI and asked to submit to chemical testing is at a 
“critical stage” in DWI proceedings.130 The court relied on its reasoning in 
Prideaux concerning the decision’s significance, stating that “[a] driver must 
make a critical and binding decision regarding chemical testing, a decision 
that will affect him or her in subsequent proceedings.”131 The implied 
consent statute placed individuals suspected of DWI in a unique situation 
that required “aid in coping with legal problems or assistance in meeting 
their adversary.”132 Specifically, the court emphasized a suspected driver’s 
need for an “objective advisor to explain the different legal consequences.”133 
Thus, Friedman recognized that Minnesota’s Constitution afforded drivers 
suspected of DWI a limited right to consult with counsel before deciding 
whether to submit to chemical testing.  
The Court clarified the applicability of the limited right to counsel 
recognized in Friedman and restricted its application only to implied 
consent cases because of the unique decision and consequences that come 
with the reading of the advisory.134 In State v. Hunn, without reading the 
                                                           
124 Id. at 829. 
125 Id.  
126 Id.  
127 Id.  
128 Id.  
129 Id.; MINN. STAT. § 169.123, subdiv. 4 (1990).  
130 Friedman, 473 N.W.2d at 833.  
131 Id. at 832.  
132 Id. at 833.  
133 Id. (“An attorney, not a police officer, is the appropriate source of legal advice. An attorney 
functions as an objective advisor who could explain the alternative choices.”).   
134 State v. Hunn, 911 N.W.2d 816, 819–20 (Minn. 2018).  
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Implied Consent Advisory, an officer requested that an individual suspected 
of driving under the influence of a controlled substance submit to a urine 
test.135 The individual agreed and the test showed amphetamine and 
methamphetamine in his urine.136 He was formally charged and 
subsequently moved to suppress the urine test results because the officer 
failed to vindicate his right to counsel prior to testing by not informing him 
of his rights or the consequences of his decision.137 Ultimately, the court 
concluded that the constitutional limited right to counsel is triggered only 
upon a reading of the Implied Consent Advisory.138 Where the implied 
consent law is not invoked, the court found that the constitutional right to 
counsel does not attach until commencement of formal judicial 
proceedings.139 
III. THE ROSENBUSH DECISION 
A. Facts and Procedure 
On July 23, 2017, a Dakota County Sheriff’s Deputy was dispatched 
to investigate a car that allegedly left the scene of an accident.140 The deputy 
noticed front-end damage on Rosenbush’s vehicle and stopped her based 
on his suspicion that she was involved in the car accident.141 Specifically, the 
deputy believed that Rosenbush drove into a ditch, hit a sign, and left the 
scene of an accident.142 The deputy conducted an investigative detention to 
further scrutinize his suspicion. Throughout the course of the deputy’s 
questioning, he began to suspect that Rosenbush had consumed alcohol.143  
 Rosenbush made two admissions during the conversation. First, she 
admitted her involvement in the car accident.144 Second, she admitted to 
consuming “two to three beers” earlier in the day.145 The deputy then 
requested Rosenbush perform a field sobriety test. Although she initially 
                                                           
135 Id. at 817. 
136 Id. at 817–18. 
137 Id. at 818. 
138 Id. at 819–20. 
139 State v. Nielsen, 530 N.W.2d 212, 215 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995).  
140 State v. Rosenbush, No. A18–0377, 2018 WL 3340530, at *1 (Minn. Ct. App. July 9, 
2018).  
141 Id. at *1–2.  
142 State v. Rosenbush, 931 N.W.2d 91, 93 (Minn. 2019).  
143 Id. In addition to an alcohol-like odor coming from Rosenbush, she was crying and slow 
to respond to questions. Id.   
144 Rosenbush, 2018 WL 3340530, at *2 (Rosenbush stated she had “misjudged a turn, gone 
off the road, hit a sign, and driven away.”).  
145 Rosenbush, 931 N.W.2d at 93.  
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refused, eventually she cooperated and agreed to take the breath test.146 The 
preliminary breath test results revealed that her alcohol concentration was 
over the legal limit.147 At some point in the conversation, the deputy inquired 
about the physical marks on Rosenbush’s wrists.148 She informed him of her 
recent suicide attempt and further stated that her suicidal urges were 
resurfacing.149 
 The deputy arrested Rosenbush for driving while intoxicated (DWI), 
but rather than transporting her to the police station, he arranged for an 
ambulance to bring her to the hospital to be placed on a mental health hold 
pursuant to the county crisis unit’s recommendations.150 While Rosenbush 
was en route to the hospital, the deputy’s supervisor obtained a search 
warrant for a blood sample from Rosenbush, which was faxed to the 
hospital.151 Once the deputy arrived at the hospital, he served Rosenbush 
with the search warrant and read her the Implied Consent Advisory for 
blood and urine tests in compliance with Minnesota Statute section 171.177, 
subdivision 1.152 The test advisory informed Rosenbush that “refusal to 
submit to a blood or urine test is a crime,” but did not convey to Rosenbush 
that she had a right to consult counsel before making her decision.153 Based 
on this information, Rosenbush allowed a nurse to draw her blood for 
purposes of chemical testing.154 The test results revealed that her blood 
alcohol concentration was over the legal limit of .08.155  
 Rosenbush was charged with fourth-degree DWI.156 Rosenbush 
moved to suppress the results of the blood test, arguing that the deputy failed 
to vindicate her limited constitutional right to counsel established in 
Friedman prior to submitting to the chemical test.157 The district court 
granted Rosenbush’s motion to suppress the results of the blood tests, 
                                                           
146 Id.  
147 Id. 
148 Rosenbush, 2018 WL 3340530, at *2. 
149 Id.  
150 Id. She was arrested pursuant to MINN. STAT. § 169A.20 (2018). 
151 Rosenbush, 931 N.W.2d at 94. 
152 Id.  
153 Id. 
154 Id.  
155 Id.  
156 Id.; MINN. STAT. §§ 169A.20, subdiv. 1(1), 169A.27 (2018). In addition to the DWI 
charges, Rosenbush was charged with leaving the scene of an accident (MINN. STAT. § 
169.09, subdiv. 2 (2018)) and her driver’s license was revoked under MINN. STAT. § 171.177, 
subdiv. 5 (2018). Neither issue was addressed on appeal. Rosenbush, 931 N.W.2d at 94 n.1.  
157 Rosenbush, 931 N.W.2d at 94; Friedman v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 473 N.W.2d 828 
(Minn. 1991) (finding that the Minnesota Constitution afforded drivers suspected of DWI a 
limited right to counsel prior to deciding whether to comply with a chemical testing request).  
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finding that her constitutional rights were violated because she was not 
afforded the right to consult with counsel before deciding whether to submit 
to the blood test.158 The State appealed the district court’s pretrial 
suppression order.159 
B. The Minnesota Court of Appeals’ Decision 
On appeal, the State argued that the district court relied on 
inapplicable law based on the 2017 changes to the DWI laws and urged the 
court to hold that “the limited right to counsel recognized in Friedman is 
only implicated when chemical testing is sought under the implied consent 
law.”160 The state focused on the fact that law enforcement obtained a search 
warrant for Rosenbush’s blood and reasoned that “a search warrant ensures 
that a driver’s Fourth Amendment rights are protected because it is only 
issued after a probable-cause determination by a judge or magistrate. And 
because a warrant ‘commands’ a DWI arrestee to submit to testing, 
eliminating any choice to do otherwise, the testing is merely investigative.”161 
In addition to the Fourth Amendment protections, the State argued that 
“the existence of the warrant shields the driver from having to ‘meet[] his 
adversary’ in the form of a police officer who acts ‘with full legal power of 
the state.’”162 Thus, the State urged the court to refuse to extend the limited 
right to counsel to warranted chemical tests.163 
 Conversely, Rosenbush challenged the State’s reasoning, contending 
that the limited right to counsel is triggered whenever a driver is presented 
with a choice of submitting to a chemical test that carries immediate 
consequences.164 According to Rosenbush, the only time the right to counsel 
does not attach is “when drivers do not have the choice to refuse testing.”165 
                                                           
158 Rosenbush, 931 N.W.2d at 94.  
159 Id.  
160 State v. Rosenbush, No. A18–0377, 2018 WL 3340530, at *7 (Minn. Ct. App. July 9, 
2018); see also Respondent’s Brief at 9, State v. Rosenbush, 931 N.W.2d 91 (Minn. 2019) 
(No. A18-0377) (“The district court’s conclusion in this case is erroneous because the limited 
right to counsel under Friedman is inapplicable here . . . because law enforcement obtained 
a valid search warrant to collect the blood sample.”).  
161 Rosenbush, 2018 WL 3340530, at *7–8 (citing MINN. STAT. § 626.05 (2016)); State v. 
Condon, 497 N.W.2d 272, 275 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993) (“[I]f a driver has no choice . . . there 
is no need, and hence no right, to contact counsel.”); see also Respondent’s Brief, supra note 
160, at 10 (“[T]he existence of a warrant alters the testing process in such a way that a driver 
has no legal right that must be either exercised or forfeited.” (citing State v. Maddox, 825 
N.W.2d 140, 144 (Minn. Ct. App. 2013))).  
162 Rosenbush, 2018 WL 3340530, at *8 (citing Friedman, 473 N.W.2d at 833–34).  
163 Id. at *7. 
164 Id.  
165 Id. at *3. 
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Because the existing statute affords drivers subjected to a warranted search 
of blood or urine a choice that carries immediate consequences, drivers 
suspected of DWI may nevertheless face a consequential choice concerning 
submission to chemical testing, despite the presence of a search warrant.166  
 The Minnesota Court of Appeals recognized the merit of both 
arguments, but ultimately found in favor of the State and reversed the district 
court’s suppression of the chemical test results.167 The court’s analysis 
focused on the inadequacy of the “unique choice” presented to 
Rosenbush.168 The court found that Rosenbush was not presented with a 
unique decision because the deputy did not give Rosenbush a choice.169 He 
did not ask for Rosenbush’s consent to the test, nor inform her that her 
refusal would prohibit the State from obtaining her blood for the chemical 
test.170 In short, the Court of Appeals concluded that in order for a driver 
suspected of DWI to have a limited constitutional right to counsel, the 
officer must give the suspect “a choice between alternatives that carr[y] 
different, significant, legal ramifications.”171 Otherwise, a warranted search 
of a driver’s blood does not constitute a “critical stage” of a DWI proceeding 
to trigger the limited constitutional right to counsel.172 The Minnesota 
Supreme Court granted Rosenbush’s petition for review.173 
C. The Minnesota Supreme Court’s Decision  
The Minnesota Supreme Court framed the issue to be reviewed as 
follows:  
The issue before us is whether a driver arrested on suspicion of 
DWI, read an implied-consent advisory, and presented with a 
                                                           
166 Id. at *9.  
167 Id. at *8–9.  
168 Id. at *9.  
169 Id. at *10.  
170 Id.  
171 Id. The Minnesota Court of Appeals held that “although the officer knew Rosenbush had 
a choice about whether to submit to a test, because he chose to withhold that information 
from Rosenbush, the officer extinguished her constitutional right to consult with an attorney. 
And because the officer deliberately withheld that critical information, the court said, ‘We 
are persuaded that the information Rosenbush received makes this case more like Hunn 
than Friedman.’” Appellant’s Brief and Addendum at 17–18, State v. Rosenbush, 931 
N.W.2d 91 (Minn. 2019) (No. A18-0377). But the Minnesota Supreme Court rejected this 
logic because although Minnesota Statute section 169A.52, subdivision 1 and section 
171.177, subdivision 13 prohibit law enforcement from executing the search warrant if the 
driver refuses, the choice to refuse to comply with the warrant still exists regardless of the 
information known to the driver. Rosenbush, 2018 WL 3340530 at *5–6 n.8.  
172 Id. at *4.  
173 State v. Rosenbush, 931 N.W.2d 91, 94 (Minn. 2019).  
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search warrant authorizing a search of her blood has the right “to 
a reasonable opportunity to obtain legal advice before deciding 
whether to submit to chemical testing” under Article I, Section 6 
of the Minnesota Constitution.174 
 The majority’s analysis first examined recent changes made to 
Minnesota’s implied consent laws.175 Specifically, the court noted the 
significance of two differences between the current statutory provision and 
its predecessor: the new warrant requirement for blood and urine tests and 
the new fluid-test advisory. Minnesota Statute section 169A.51, subdivision 
3 now requires that blood and urine tests “be conducted only pursuant to a 
search warrant . . . or a judicially recognized exception to the search warrant 
requirement” and in accordance with the procedures specified in Minnesota 
Statute section 171.177.176 Although the breath test advisory continues to 
require that law enforcement inform drivers of the limited right to counsel, 
the new fluid-test advisory eliminates that prerequisite.177 The new fluid-test 
advisory, pursuant to Minnesota Statute section 171. 177, subdivision 1, 
requires police to inform drivers “that refusal to submit to a blood or urine 
test is a crime.”178  
In its analysis concerning the new warrant requirement, the majority 
noted that Rosenbush, like every person subjected to a search warrant, was 
presented with a choice: “comply with the warrant or be subject to criminal 
penalties.”179 The court further went on to state that it has “never held that 
the Minnesota Constitution provides the subject of a search warrant with the 
right to consult counsel before a warrant can be executed.”180 Thus, because 
Rosenbush was faced with a choice that paralleled the choice any other 
individual subjected to a search warrant, the choice was “not enough to 
justify an extension of Friedman to warranted searches.”181 In essence, the 
court determined that the presence of a search warrant removed the features 
that made the decision in Friedman “unique.”182 The majority explained:  
                                                           
174 Id. (citing Friedman v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 473 N.W.2d 828, 835 (Minn. 1991)). 
175 Id. at 95–97.  
176 Id. at 97; see also MINN. STAT. § 171.177, subdiv. 3(a) (2019).  
177 Rosenbush, 931 N.W.2d at 97; see also MINN. STAT. § 169A.51, subdiv. 2 (2019) 
(requiring that at the time a breath test is requested, an officer must inform the person: “(1) 
that Minnesota law requires the person to take a test . . . ; (2) that refusal to submit to a breath 
test is a crime; and (3) that the person has the right to consult with an attorney, but that this 
right is limited to the extent that it cannot unreasonably delay administration of the test.”). 
178 Rosenbush, 931 N.W.2d at 97.  
179 Id.  
180 Id.  
181 Id. at 97–98.  
182 Id.  
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The existence of a search warrant eliminates many of the 
concerns that led us to expand the right to counsel in Friedman. 
The Fourth Amendment protects “personal privacy and dignity 
against unwarranted intrusion by the state,” by generally requiring 
that police obtain a search warrant before searching a person or 
place. And the presence of a search warrant ensures that drivers 
are not faced with the unchecked “legal power of the state,” 
because “a neutral and detached magistrate” has been interposed. 
Therefore, when a suspected impaired driver is presented with a 
search warrant for a blood or urine test, the driver is not “meeting 
his adversary” in the same manner as the driver in Friedman 
because a neutral judicial officer has determined that the police 
may lawfully obtain a sample of the of the driver’s blood.183 
 The majority’s final point centered around the meaningfulness of the 
driver’s choice. Under the new law, test refusal is a crime in its own right 
and carries a penalty similar to a DWI conviction.184 According to the 
majority, “[t]he similarity of these penalties under the current law further 
cuts against the utility of counsel in this situation where little explanation of 
the ‘alternative choices’ and ‘legal ramifications’ is necessary.”185  
 Ultimately, the Minnesota Supreme Court found that “conducting a 
search pursuant to a lawful warrant adequately safeguards the ‘human rights 
[and] human dignity’ about which we were concerned in Friedman and 
supplies meaningful ‘procedural protection for the rights of the criminally 
accused.’”186 Thus, the Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed the court of 
appeals’ reversal of the district court’s pretrial suppression of the blood 
alcohol concentration results and held that the limited constitutional right 
to counsel recognized in Friedman does not apply where a suspected driver 
is faced with a warranted blood test.187 
D. The Dissent  
The dissent emphasized the court’s reasoning in Hunn, which 
recognized that the limited right to counsel is triggered based on the “unique 
                                                           
183 Id. (citation omitted).  
184 Id. at 99; see MINN. STAT. § 169A.26 (2018) (stating that refusal to submit to a chemical 
test constitutes a gross misdemeanor if no aggravating factors are present); MINN. STAT. § 
169A.27 (2018) (stipulating that DWI constitutes a misdemeanor if no aggravating factors 
are present).  
185 Rosenbush, 931 N.W.2d at 99 (citing Friedman v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 473 N.W.2d 
828, 833 (Minn. 1991)).  
186 Id.   
187 Id.  
25
Perunovich: Limiting A Driver’s Limited Right To Counsel In DWI Proceedings:
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2020
392 MITCHELL HAMLINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 46:3 
  
decision” and “consequences that came with the reading of the [implied 
consent] advisory.”188  
First, the dissent parallels Rosenbush’s situation to that in Friedman, 
where the court found a unique decision existed. Like Friedman, 
Rosenbush was read the applicable implied consent advisory and presented 
with two options: “submit to a chemical test and give the police potentially 
incriminating evidence, or refuse and have her license automatically 
revoked and potentially convicted of DWI.”189 The dissent emphasized the 
variation of the consequences involved. In Friedman, the driver’s 
consequences consisted of license revocation and potential DWI 
conviction. A driver in Rosenbush’s position could face not only license 
revocation and potential DWI conviction but, additionally, independent 
criminal charges for test refusal.190 Therefore, the dissent argues that the 
unique decision Rosenbush encountered affords her the same right to 
counsel as the driver in Friedman.191 
 The dissent explicitly disagreed with the majority’s reasoning that the 
presence of a search warrant eradicates the “unique decision” recognized in 
Friedman because of the customary scenario. The majority reasoned that 
the decision regarding one’s compliance with a search warrant is not a 
“unique decision” because every individual subjected to a search warrant 
must make the same decision—comply with the warrant or bear the 
punishment for refusal.192 While the dissent acknowledged the validity of the 
consequences for refusal to comply with a search warrant, it argued that the 
implied consent law is sui generis193 because it expressly prohibits law 
enforcement from executing a search warrant and conducting a chemical 
test after a driver’s refusal, albeit with certain exceptions.194 In any other 
context, police may be authorized to use reasonable force in order to 
execute the search warrant when faced with refusal to comply.195 Because 
the implied consent law forbids law enforcement from executing the search 
                                                           
188 Id. at 100 (Hudson, J., dissenting) (citing State v. Hunn, 911 N.W.2d 816, 819–20 (Minn. 
2018)).  
189 Id. (citing MINN. STAT. §§ 169A.21, subdiv. 1, 2(2), 171.177, subdiv. 4 (2018)).  
190 Id. (citing MINN. STAT. § 169A.26 (2018)) (making a first-time test refusal a gross 
misdemeanor).  
191 Id. at 100–01.  
192 Id. at 101.  
193 Sui Generis, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) ( “Of its own kind or class; unique 
or peculiar.”).  
194 Rosenbush, 931 N.W.2d at 101.  
195 Id. (citing MINN. STAT. § 171.177, subdiv. 13 (2018)) (“If a person refuses to permit a 
blood or urine test as required by a search warrant . . . then a test must not be given.”); see 
also MINN. STAT. § 169A.52, subdiv. 1 (2018) (including the same prohibition for breath 
tests).  
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warrant, it is distinguishable from search warrants in any other context.196 
Thus, the dissent concluded that the presence of a search warrant does not 
change the fact that the driver is faced with a unique decision, and that 
decision should trigger the limited right to counsel announced in 
Friedman.197 
 The dissent then focused on the fundamental differences 
encompassed by the Fourth and Sixth Amendment and the country’s 
precedent. It articulated that search warrants are meant to protect the Fourth 
Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures.198 
Ultimately, search warrants protect individual privacy.199 The Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel, in contrast, is meant to protect the average 
individual lacking the legal skill and knowledge to adequately defend 
himself.200 The dissent concluded, “[b]ecause the Fourth Amendment and 
the right to counsel protect fundamentally different interests, the presence 
of one does not negate the utility of the other.”201 
Lastly, the dissent rejected the majority’s analysis that the presence of 
a search warrant ameliorates the concerns presented in Friedman.202 It 
acknowledged that a search warrant will aid a driver in “meeting his 
adversary,” but emphasized lingering concerns that a search warrant cannot 
resolve.203 The possibility that drivers may be confused about the “legal 
ramifications” of their decisions under the implied consent advisory urged 
the court to provide a limited right to counsel.204 A search warrant is 
obviously unable to provide “aid in coping with legal problems” to drivers, 
                                                           
196 Rosenbush, 931 N.W.2d at 101 (Hudson, J., dissenting) (“Thus—in a white–collar criminal 
investigation, for instance—an individual’s ‘choice’ in deciding whether to comply with a 
warrant is not the same as a driver’s choice in deciding whether to submit to chemical testing 
under the implied-consent law.”).  
197 Id.   
198 Id. (citing U.S. CONST. amend. IV).  
199 Id. (citing Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767 (1966)) (regarding “personal privacy 
and dignity”); Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160 (2016); Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 
757 (1985).  
200 Rosenbush, 931 N.W.2d at 101 (Hudson, J., dissenting) (“The right to counsel, on the 
other hand, ‘protect[s] the lay person who “lacks both the skill and knowledge” to defend 
him- or herself.’” (citing Friedman v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 473 N.W.2d 828, 833 (Minn. 
1991))).  
201 Id.; Deegan v. State, 711 N.W.2d 89, 98 (Minn. 2006) (“[O]ur view, under the Minnesota 
Constitution, [is] that a defendant’s access to the other protections afforded in criminal 
proceedings cannot be meaningful without the assistance of counsel.”).  
202 Rosenbush, 931 N.W.2d at 101 (Hudson, J., dissenting).  
203 Id. at 102 (Justice Hudson noted that this concern was not the driving force behind the 
recognition of a limited right to counsel in Friedman).  
204 Id.   
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and thus the limited right to counsel is still necessary.205 Additionally, a driver 
asked to submit to chemical testing is confronted with a “critical and 
binding” decision that will affect the driver in subsequent DWI 
proceedings.206 A search warrant does not make the decision any less critical 
nor binding because it cannot stop the driver’s decision from “impair[ing] 
defense on the merits” if they submit to the testing.207 
IV. ANALYSIS 
A. Problems with Minnesota Statute Section 171.177  
 The Legislature’s enactment of Minnesota Statute section 171.177 is 
a logical response to the United States Supreme Court’s holding in 
Birchfield208 and the Minnesota Supreme Court’s holdings in Thompson209 
and Trahan.210 Collectively, those cases held that for test refusal to be 
actionable as a criminal offense, it must be supported by a valid search 
warrant. Thus, subdivision 1 requires that chemical testing of blood and 
urine be conducted pursuant to a search warrant.211 Rather than maintaining 
consistency in the procedural execution of search warrants, the statute 
included various provisions that limit law enforcement’s ability to lawfully 
execute the search warrant and obtain the object of the search under this 
statute. These provisions clearly contradict the fundamental purpose of a 
search warrant and modify the procedural execution of search warrants 
under the implied consent law.  
 First, Minnesota Statute section 171.177, subdivision 2 provides that 
test refusal is only actionable where a driver refuses to take both a blood 
and urine test.212 This “choice of test” option is provided to accommodate 
drivers who may have a “reasonable aversion to giving a blood or urine 
                                                           
205 Id.   
206 Id.   
207 Id.   
208 Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160 (2016).  
209 State v. Thompson, 886 N.W.2d 224 (Minn. 2016).  
210 State v. Trahan, 886 N.W.2d 216 (Minn. 2016).  
211 MINN. STAT. § 171.177, subdiv. 1 (2019). 
212 Id. § 171.177, subdiv. 2 (“If the person to whom the test is directed objects to the test, the 
officer shall offer the person an alternative test of either blood or urine. Action may be taken 
against a person who refuses to take a blood test only if a urine test was offered and action 
may be taken against a person who refuses to take a urine test only if a blood test was 
offered.”); 
see also MINN. STAT. § 169A.51, subdiv. 4 (2019) (stating the same rule but clarifying that 
this limitation does not apply to an unconscious person).  
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sample.”213 Offering drivers this choice could be reasonable if the two tests 
produce equally reliable results. However, blood and urine tests are far from 
equivalent. Because urine test results are consistently less accurate than 
blood test results, most states find urine test results inadmissible in DWI 
proceedings.214 In fact, only eleven states, including Minnesota, admit urine 
testing in DWI prosecutions.215 Despite the fact that most studies 
demonstrate that urine alcohol concentrations do not correlate well with 
BACs, the Minnesota Supreme Court has upheld the validity and use of 
urine alcohol concentrations.216 Although they may be admissible, expert 
DWI defense attorneys advise drivers to choose urine tests over blood tests 
because they are most likely to be deemed inadmissible.217  
 Second, Minnesota Statute section 171.177, subdivision 13 prohibits 
law enforcement from executing a search warrant if the driver refuses to 
submit to the warranted chemical test.218 Essentially, this provision requires 
the driver’s consent before the search warrant can be lawfully executed. By 
including this provision in the statute, the legislature effectively constructed 
a novel power that now allows drivers to prevent the execution of a judicial 
order. Not only is this additional requirement unique to search warrants 
executed under this statute, but it also contradicts the very nature of search 
warrants.  
 The Minnesota Legislature has defined a search warrant as an “order 
in writing, in the name of the state, signed by a court other than a court 
exercising probate jurisdiction, directed to a peace officer, commanding the 
peace officer to make a search as authorized by law and hold any item 
seized, subject to the order of a court.”219 However, under Minnesota Statute 
section 171.177, subdivision 13, a search warrant does not hold the same 
meaning because it no longer commands a police officer to execute the 
lawfully authorized search but rather requires law enforcement to obtain a 
driver’s consent first.  
                                                           
213 State v. Hagen, 529 N.W.2d 712, 715 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995) (citing Franko v. Comm’r of 
Pub. Safety, 432 N.W.2d 469, 472 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988)).  
214 Robert H. Williams & Jerrold B. Leikin, Medicolegal Issues and Specimen Collection for 
Ethanol Testing, 30 LABORATORY MEDICINE 530, 534 (1999).  
215 Maury D. Beaulier, Winning DWI: Challenging the Urine Test, HG.ORG 
https://www.hg.org/legal-articles/winning-dwi-challenging-the-urine-test-7973 
[https://perma.cc/A4EM-FSDZ].  
216 Williams & Leikin, supra note 214, at 534 (“Some physicians may use this [urine/blood] 
ratio to estimate BAC in a clinical or emergency setting. However, it should never be used 
to calculate a BAC for medicolegal purposes.”).  
217 Beaulier, supra note 215. 
218 MINN. STAT. § 171.177, subdiv. 13 (2019).  
219 MINN. STAT. § 626.05, subdiv. 1 (2019) (emphasis added).  
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 Lastly, refusal to submit to the warranted chemical testing constitutes 
an independent criminal charge.220 In every other context, “obstructing legal 
process” is the criminal charge that attaches to refusal to comply with a 
search warrant.221 Yet, pursuant to subdivision 13(b), chemical test refusal is 
not criminally punishable as obstructing legal process unless it involves the 
use of force or violence or the threat of force or violence.222 There is no valid 
rationale for the distinction between the respective legal ramifications. The 
imposition of differing charges further exemplifies the peculiar role search 
warrants play in the implied consent law context, pursuant to section 
171.177.  
 A more sensical statute would impose the search warrant 
requirement for chemical testing of fluid samples, but would omit the 
aforementioned provisions that provide the driver with the ability to control 
which test is administered, limit the execution of the search warrant, and 
prevent law enforcement from obtaining the fluid samples. Without these 
provisions, any refusal to comply with the search warrant would be treated 
as obstructing legal process, rather than chemical testing refusal. The 
omission of these provisions would eliminate any confusion regarding a 
driver’s limited right to counsel because in the typical search warrant 
situation, Minnesota’s Constitution does not provide the subject of a search 
warrant with the right to counsel. However, the current statute provides no 
clarity concerning the limited right to counsel. In fact, it creates a new 
situation, one which should afford drivers the limited right to counsel based 
on the court’s reasoning in Friedman.   
B. The Minnesota Supreme Court Got It Wrong  
In Rosenbush, the court overlooked the existence of the same 
fundamental concerns that supported its decision to afford accused drivers 
                                                           
220 See MINN. STAT. § 169A.26, subdiv. 1(b) (2018) (criminalizing refusal to submit to 
chemical test as a third-degree DWI). 
221 Compare MINN. STAT. § 609.50, subdiv. 2 (2019) (stating that if the violation did not 
“create[] a risk of death, substantial bodily harm, or serious property damage” and was not 
“accompanied by force or violence or the threat thereof,” the violation is punishable by 
“imprisonment for not more than 90 days or to payment of a fine of not more than $1,000”), 
with MINN. STAT. § 169A.26, subdiv. 1(b) (2019) (pronouncing that a refusal to submit to 
chemical testing constitutes a third degree DWI and is punishable by up to one year in prison 
and a $3,000 fine).  
222 MINN. STAT. § 171.177, subdiv. 13(b) (2019) (“A refusal to submit to a[n alcohol 
concentration] test does not constitute a violation of section 609.50 [obstructing legal 
process], unless the refusal was accompanied by force or violence or the threat of force or 
violence.”); see also MINN. STAT. § 169A.52, subdiv. 1 (2019).  
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the limited right to counsel in Friedman.223 After Rosenbush was arrested, 
the officer presented her with a search warrant for her blood sample and 
informed her that refusal is a crime.224 At that moment, she was faced with a 
unique choice that would follow her through subsequent criminal 
proceedings. Namely, she was forced to determine whether it would be in 
her best interest to submit a blood sample for chemical testing purposes and 
possibly give the police not only incriminating evidence—but potentially 
provide the police with proof of her guilt—or decline to submit to the 
chemical testing and suffer the consequences of refusal. In Friedman, the 
court found that the “Minnesota Constitution protects the individual’s right 
to consult counsel when confronted with this decision.”225  
Despite the analogous decision involved in Rosenbush, the Minnesota 
Supreme Court declined to extend the limited right to counsel to the 
execution of a search warrant for a suspected impaired driver’s blood, 
finding that a lawful and warranted search “adequately safeguards the 
‘human rights [and] human dignity’” it was concerned with in Friedman and 
“supplies meaningful ‘procedural protection for the rights of the criminally 
accused.’”226 The court is wrong. The foundation of the court’s holding is 
based on the assertion that the existence of a search warrant fundamentally 
changes the situation created in Friedman and thus, does not support 
extending the limited right to counsel to warranted searches.227 Specifically, 
the court emphasized that the presence of a search warrant removes the 
peculiarity of the decision created by the Implied Consent Advisory by 
transforming it into one that every person subjected to a search warrant 
faces—deciding whether to comply with the search warrant or oppose the 
warrant and incur criminal penalties.228 Thus, a driver’s decision is no longer 
unique because it is one that is routinely made by every individual 
                                                           
223 State v. Rosenbush, 931 N.W.2d 91, 100 (Minn. 2019) (Hudson, J., dissenting) (“‘The 
legal ramifications of the decision to submit (or not submit) to chemical testing after the 
advisory reading are significant. . . . it may not be clear to a driver faced with the advisory 
whether the consequences for consenting or refusing will be worse.’ We affirmed that this 
‘unique decision’ and the ‘consequences that come with the reading of the advisory’ are the 
reasons that drivers have a limited right to counsel when chemical testing is requested under 
the implied–consent law.” (quoting State v. Hunn, 911 N.W.2d 816, 819–20 (Minn. 2018))).  
224 Id. at 94 (majority opinion); see also MINN. STAT. § 171.177, subdiv. 1 (2019) (requiring 
that “[a]t the time a blood or urine test is directed pursuant to a search warrant . . . the person 
must be informed that refusal to submit to a blood or urine test is a crime”).  
225 Friedman v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 473 N.W.2d 828, 833 (Minn. 1991).  
226 Rosenbush, 931 N.W.2d at 99 (quoting Friedman, 473 N.W.2d at 836).  
227 Id. at 97.  
228 Id. at 98 (citing MINN. STAT. § 609.50, subdiv. 1(1) (2019)) (making it a crime to obstruct, 
hinder, or prevent a police officer from lawfully executing any legal process).  
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confronted with a search warrant.229 However, an examination of the 
idiosyncrasies of the implied consent law demonstrates that the court’s 
simplified analysis is lacking.230  
Although it is a criminal offense to “obstruct, hinder, or prevent a 
police officer from lawfully executing any legal process,”231 police are 
permitted to continue executing the warranted search warrant despite a 
subject’s failure to comply.232 In executing the search, officers may not only 
detain individuals without violating the Fourth Amendment, but are also 
permitted to use reasonable force to execute the warrant when faced with 
defiance.233 As the dissent recognized, the implied consent law is sui 
generis.234 Distinct from the execution of warrants in every other context, the 
implied consent law essentially requires the driver’s consent prior to 
executing the warrant for blood or urine.235 Where a driver refuses to submit 
to the warrant, Minnesota Statute section 171.177, subdivision 13 expressly 
prohibits law enforcement’s execution of the warrant.236 Although refusal to 
comply with the search warrant carries independent criminal charges, this 
provision in the implied consent statute allows a driver to effectively ensure 
that law enforcement will not obtain his or her blood or urine. Similar to 
the implied consent law, failure to comply with search warrants in all other 
contexts may constitute an actionable criminal offense. However, the crucial 
distinction is that failure to comply in other contexts does not prevent law 
enforcement from obtaining the object of the warrant. Thus, the decision to 
submit to warranted chemical testing is not the same as the decision to 
                                                           
229 Id.  
230 Id. at 101 (Hudson, J., dissenting).  
231 See MINN. STAT. § 609.50 (2019) (imposing either misdemeanor, gross misdemeanor, or 
felony charges on individuals who obstruct legal process).  
232 See State v. Young, No. C4-03-375, 2003 WL 22999377, at *3–5 (Minn. Ct. App. Dec. 
23, 2003).  
233 MINN. STAT. § 609.06, subdiv. 1 (2019); see also Young, 2003 WL 22999377, at *10 
(finding the officer’s deadly use of force against an individual resisting the officer’s execution 
of the warrant was reasonable based on the totality of the circumstances); Graham v. Connor, 
490 U.S. 386, 396–97 (1989) (“The ‘reasonableness’ of a particular use of force must be 
judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 
vision of hindsight. . . . [T]he ‘reasonableness’ inquiry in an excessive force case is an 
objective one: the question is whether the officers’ actions are ‘objectively reasonable’ in light 
of the facts and circumstances confronting them, without regard to their underlying intent or 
motivation.”) (citations omitted). 
234 Rosenbush, 931 N.W.2d at 101 (Hudson, J., dissenting).  
235 MINN. STAT. § 171.177, subdiv. 13 (2019).  
236 Id. (“If a person refuses to permit a blood or urine test as required by a search warrant . . 
. then a test must not be given.”).  
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comply with a search warrant.237 The court missed a crucial component of 
its analysis by overlooking the significant distinction of these decisions and 
erred in its conclusion that the decision encountered by drivers under the 
implied consent law is no longer “unique” based on the presence of a search 
warrant.  
The court further justified its holding based on the assertion that the 
presence of a search warrant resolves the concerns that led to its holding in 
Friedman.238 The court determined that a search warrant transforms the 
encounter with law enforcement so that the “driver is not ‘meeting his 
adversary’ in the same manner as the driver in Friedman because a neutral 
judicial officer has determined that the police may lawfully obtain a sample 
of the driver’s blood.”239 However, the driver must consent to the search in 
order for the officer to execute the warrant. Thus, before the officer may 
lawfully obtain a sample of the driver’s blood, the driver is confronted with 
the same decision as in Friedman: comply or not comply with the warrant. 
The addition of the search warrant requirement did not eliminate, nor 
reduce, the uniqueness of a driver’s choice; it merely created an additional 
procedural step law enforcement must take under the implied consent law.  
The court next found that the legislative “changes to Minnesota’s 
Impaired Driving Code have made a driver’s choice less meaningful” based 
on the similar penalties imposed by test refusal and test failure.240 Because 
the penalties are similar, the utility of counsel is diminished in this situation 
because “little explanation of the ‘alternative choices’ and ‘legal 
ramifications’ is necessary.”241 Not only are the consequences attached to the 
decision more severe today than they were when Friedman was decided,242 
but Minnesota’s Impaired Driving Code is significantly more complicated 
                                                           
237 Rosenbush, 931 N.W.2d at 101 (Hudson, J., dissenting) (“Regardless of the presence of a 
warrant, the implied-consent law continues to require drivers to make a unique decision and, 
therefore, should trigger the limited right to counsel announced in Friedman.”).  
238 Id. at 99 (majority opinion) (“[T]he presence of a warrant ameliorates the concerns that 
we articulated in Friedman.”); see also Friedman v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 473 N.W.2d 
828, 833 (Minn. 1991) (indicating concern for a driver’s need for an objective advisor to 
explain alternative choices and legal ramifications arising from the decision to refuse or allow 
a chemical test).  
239 Rosenbush, 931 N.W.2d at 98 (citing Friedman, 473 N.W.2d at 833).  
240 Id. at 98–99. Compare MINN. STAT. § 169A.26 (2019) (making refusal to submit to a 
chemical test a gross misdemeanor if no aggravating factors are present), with MINN. STAT. 
§ 169A.27 (2019) (making DWI a misdemeanor if no aggravating factors are present). 
241 Rosenbush, 931 N.W.2d at 98–99 (citing Friedman, 473 N.W.2d at 833).  
242 When Friedman was decided, the consequence for test refusal was limited to civil license 
revocation. At that time, a driver’s license was suspended for 90 days for test failure and one 
year for refusal to submit to the chemical test. MINN. STAT. § 169.123 subdiv. 4 (1990). 
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now than it was when Friedman was decided.243 As of July 1, 2017, 
Minnesota’s Impaired Driving Code takes up forty-six pages of criminal 
code, filled with legal intricacies unknown to the layman. As Rosenbush 
argued, “[i]f ever someone needed the assistance of counsel, it would be to 
explain that despite a court order compelling a police officer to secure a 
sample of their blood, they could render the order toothless simply by 
uttering the word ‘no.’”244 Yet, despite the new imposition of criminal 
consequences for refusal and the increased complexities of the DWI law, 
the court determined that the presence of a search warrant and the reading 
of the condensed advisory adequately inform and equip drivers to make this 
decision without the aid of counsel. Perhaps the procedural protection of a 
search warrant and an explanatory advisory would be capable of 
safeguarding the rights of a driver suspected of DWI, but the protections 
provided by the current application of the two shields is clearly inadequate.  
C. Inadequate Fluid Test Advisory  
 In 2017, the Minnesota Legislature enacted Minnesota Statute 
section 171.177 and amended the implied consent statute. The pertinent 
modifications regarding the procedural requirements of obtaining blood 
and urine samples for chemical testing purposes under the new laws are the 
fluid-test advisory and the addition of the search warrant requirement.245 
Similar to the statutory amendments made in response to the Friedman 
holding, the Legislature effectively omitted relevant information from the 
fluid-test advisory.246 The breath test advisory continues to require police 
                                                           
243 When Friedman was decided, the consequences for test refusal were limited to the civil 
sanction of license revocation. Id. At that time, that DWI statute and the implied consent 
statute made up less than ten pages of criminal code. See id. at §§ 169.121–.1231. Today, 
Minnesota’s Impaired Driving Code is forty-six pages long. Transcript of Oral Argument, 
supra note 88. 
244 Appellant’s Brief and Addendum, supra note 171, at 21. 
245 Rosenbush, 931 N.W.2d at 97. 
246 Davis v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 517 N.W.2d 901, 902 (Minn. 1994) (“Before Friedman 
the statutory standard advisory informed each DWI arrestee, among other things: (a) 
Minnesota law requires that the person take a test to determine if the person is under the 
influence of alcohol or a controlled substance; (b) if the person refuses testing, the person’s 
driver’s license will be revoked for at least one year; (c) if the test is taken and the results 
show an alcohol concentration of .10 or more, the person’s driver’s license will be revoked 
for at least 90 days; (d) whether the test is taken or refused, the person may be subject to 
criminal penalties for DWI; (e) after testing the person may consult with an attorney; (f) after 
testing the person has the right to obtain additional testing, while in custody, by someone of 
the person’s choosing; and (g) the refusal to take a test may be offered in evidence against 
the person at trial. Following Friedman . . . the legislature dropped (b), (c), (d), (f), and (g) 
from the old advisory.”).  
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officers to inform drivers of the limited right to counsel, the blood and urine 
test advisory only requires police to inform drivers that “refusal to submit to 
a blood or urine test is a crime.”247 Although the right to counsel announced 
in Friedman was subsequently codified in statute, it is a constitutional 
requirement. 248 A constitutional requirement cannot be eliminated through 
legislation. Thus, the court’s focus on the application of these legislative 
changes in relation to the right to counsel under the implied consent law are 
misplaced.  
In Davis, the constitutionality of the 1993 amendments to the Implied 
Consent Advisory were challenged. Despite the court’s concerns regarding 
the “deficiencies of the current advisory,” it ultimately upheld the legislative 
amendments, concluding “[o]nce the supreme court announced the limited 
right to counsel in Friedman, the legislature had the power to shift from the 
police officer to the attorney the burden of informing the driver about the 
details of rights and sanctions under the implied consent law.”249 As 
Rosenbush argued: 
Remembering that the truncated implied consent advisory was 
only upheld against a due process challenge in Davis because it 
was supplemented by the right to discuss the missing information 
with an attorney, this new statute is constitutionally unsound 
where it provides only a single crumb of information regarding a 
driver’s rights and obligations, while at the same time depriving 
the driver of the right to legal consultation - what the court of 
appeals referred to as Friedman’s “main protection.”250 
The truncated advisory mandated by the new implied consent law, 
coupled with the court’s decision in Rosenbush, infringes upon a suspected 
driver’s right to obtain full and accurate information concerning the 
decision, its alternatives, and the legal ramifications involved. In 1991, when 
the Minnesota Supreme Court first recognized the state constitutional right 
to consult with counsel before submitting to a chemical test, the Implied 
Consent Advisory encompassed specific and comprehensive explanations 
                                                           
247 MINN. STAT. §§ 169A.51, subdiv. 2, 171.177, subdiv. 1 (2019). As Rosenbush argued, 
“There is no justification for either the legislature or the courts to treat those being asked to 
submit to a fluid test any differently than those being asked to submit to a breath test. By 
doing so, both the legislature and the court of appeals have ignored this court’s directive that 
the Minnesota Constitution affords all drivers being asked to make a choice about submitting 
to impaired driving testing the limited right to consult with an attorney before doing so.” 
Appellant’s Brief and Addendum, supra note 171, at 23. 
248 See Comm’r of Pub. Safety v. Campbell, 494 N.W.2d 268, 269 (Minn. 1992) (recognizing 
that the limited right to counsel recognized in Friedman is based on the right under the state 
constitution rather than statutory rights).  
249 Davis, 517 N.W.2d at 902–04.   
250 Appellant’s Brief and Addendum, supra note 171, at 25–26. 
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of the obligation and consequences of either taking or refusing a test.251 At 
that time, a driver had the right to consult with counsel, but only after 
deciding to submit to the chemical test.252 Despite the informative advisory 
and the federal precedent—holding that drivers had no federal constitutional 
right to assistance of counsel at this stage of the process—the Minnesota 
Supreme Court found that drivers had the right, under Minnesota’s state 
constitution, to consult with counsel before deciding whether to submit to 
the chemical test.253 Ultimately, the court stated:  
[W]e hold that the point at which an individual is asked by law 
enforcement officials to undergo a blood alcohol test constitutes 
a critical stage in the criminal process and that article I, section 6 
of the Minnesota Constitution guarantees an individual in such a 
situation the limited right to counsel within a reasonable time 
before submitting to testing[.]254 
 As Rosenbush correctly pointed out, the same five conditions255 that 
urged the Minnesota Supreme Court to oppose statutory provisions and 
afford drivers the right to a pre-test consultation are even more important 
today, under Minnesota Statute section 171.177.256 Now, drivers are forced 
to rely on the information provided by the advisory because they no longer 
have the limited right to counsel. When Rosenbush was confronted with the 
critical and binding decision concerning compliance with the search 
                                                           
251 MINN. STAT. § 169.123 (1990). The advisory informed drivers that Minnesota law required 
them to submit to a test of blood, breath, or urine to determine if they were under the 
influence of alcohol and that their licenses would be revoked for a specified period of time 
if the results were greater than 0.10. Additionally, they were informed that refusal to comply 
with the test request would increase the period their license would be revoked, and they may 
face criminal prosecution if they had prior alcohol-related license revocation on record. 
Refusal could be used as evidence against them in a criminal trial. Finally, drivers were 
informed that they had the right to obtain an additional test at their own expense while in 
custody and could consult with an attorney, but only after deciding to submit to the state’s 
test.  
252 Id.  
253 Friedman v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 473 N.W.2d 828, 833–34 (Minn. 1991).  
254 Id. at 837.  
255 The five conditions are:  
1. Drivers had no constitutional right to refuse a test of any sort; 2. Drivers had the statutory 
option to refuse a test, despite having no constitutional right to do so; 3. If the driver refused 
a test, none would be administered; 4. Drivers could be prosecuted for refusing to submit to 
a test; and 5. The Commissioner of Public Safety would take immediate, pre–hearing action 
against the driver’s license of any driver who either failed or refused a test. 
Appellant’s Brief and Addendum, supra note 171, at 18–19. 
256 Id. at 21. 
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warrant, the only information she was afforded came from the deputy.257 
After serving Rosenbush with the warrant for her blood, the deputy 
informed her that failure to submit to the test is a crime.258 Not only was this 
information insufficient, it was also inaccurate. Minnesota Statute section 
171.177, subdivision 2 states:  
If the warrant authorizes either a blood or urine test, the officer 
may direct whether the test is of blood or urine. If the person to 
whom the test is directed objects to the test, the officer shall offer 
the person an alternative test of either blood or urine. Action may 
be taken against a person who refuses to take a blood test only if 
a urine test was offered and action may be taken against a person 
who refuses to take a urine test only if a blood test was offered.259 
Rosenbush could not have been prosecuted for the crime of test refusal 
based solely on failure to comply with the search warrant for a blood sample. 
For Rosenbush’s failure to submit to constitute a criminal offense, she 
would have had to refuse to comply not only with the blood test, but also 
with a urine test. Because the search warrant only authorized the search of 
Rosenbush’s blood, the deputy would have had to apply for a subsequent 
search warrant for Rosenbush’s urine and request that she submit to the 
urine test.260 Rosenbush’s refusal to comply with the search warrant would 
only become a crime upon her failure to submit to the subsequent urine 
test.261 Not only was the advisory, as stated in Minnesota Statute section 
171.177, subdivision 1 inadequate, it arguably violated Rosenbush’s due 
process rights.262 This problem is not unique to Rosenbush’s situation, but 
could happen whenever a search warrant limits the search to obtaining only 
one of the two applicable fluid samples.  
                                                           
257 The Minnesota Supreme Court has previously recognized that “[a]n attorney, not a police 
officer, is the appropriate source of legal advice. An attorney functions as an objective advisor 
who could explain the alternative choices.” Friedman, 473 N.W.2d at 833.  
258 State v. Rosenbush, 931 N.W.2d 91, 94 (Minn. 2019).  
259 MINN. STAT. § 171.177, subdiv. 2 (2019). 
260 Although it is possible for a search warrant to specify blood and/or urine, the search warrant 
involved in Rosenbush was only for a blood sample. See Rosenbush, 931 N.W.2d at 93. 
261 MINN. STAT. § 171.177, subdiv. 13 (2019); see also Transcript of Oral Argument, supra 
note 88. 
262 In determining that a license revocation violated due process rights, the court in 
McDonnell v. Commissioner of Public Safety, 473 N.W.2d 848 (Minn. 1991) relied on the 
three elements from Johnson v. Commissioner of Public Safety: 
(1) the person whose license was revoked submitted to a breath, blood, or urine test; (2) the 
person prejudicially relied on the implied consent advisory in deciding to undergo testing; 
and (3) the implied consent advisory did not accurately inform the person of the legal 
consequences of refusing to submit to the testing. 
911 N.W.2d 506, 508–09 (Minn. 2018).  
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An additional shortcoming of the advisory is that it fails to inform 
suspected drivers that failure to submit is potentially a more serious offense 
with more severe consequences than a DWI conviction. There are plausible 
circumstances where a driver suspected of DWI might think it advantageous 
to refuse the chemical testing in order to decrease the possibility of criminal 
DWI conviction.263 To a layman, conviction for chemical test refusal may 
seem less severe than DWI conviction. However, to the contrary, first-time 
test refusal carries more severe consequences than first-time test failure.264 A 
driver’s first-time test failure constitutes a misdemeanor offense, which may 
result in a $1000 fine and a 90-day jail sentence,265 whereas a driver’s first-
time test refusal constitutes a gross misdemeanor and can result in a $3000 
fine and potentially one year in prison.266 Without knowledge of, or access 
to, this information, drivers like Rosenbush are forced to make ill-informed 
decisions that could carry significant consequences throughout subsequent 
criminal proceedings. As Justice Hudson stated, “A search warrant will not 
give drivers ‘aid in coping with legal problems,’ and will not stop their 
decisions from ‘impair[ing] defense on the merits’ if they submit to 
testing.”267 Drivers suspected of DWI require an objective advisor to explain 
the differing legal ramifications of the choices. Because neither the advisory 
nor the search warrant can adequately fulfil this need, Minnesota’s state 
constitutional limited right to counsel, recognized in Friedman, should 
apply when a driver is asked to submit to warranted chemical testing.  
It is important to note that the purpose behind the implied-consent 
advisory is to “inform a driver of the serious consequences of refusal in an 
                                                           
263 In Prideaux, the court recognized, “depending upon the individual driver’s circumstances, 
the decreased possibility of criminal conviction may be worth the 6-month loss of his license 
if he does not depend on his driver’s license for his livelihood.” Prideaux v. State, Dep’t of 
Pub. Safety, 247 N.W.2d 385, 390 (Minn. 1976). Although the current legal ramifications 
associated with test refusal are different from when Prideaux was decided, the reasoning 
behind the court’s analysis still applies.  
264 MINN. STAT. §§ 169A.26–.27 (2019); Rosenbush, 931 N.W.2d at 102 (Hudson, J., 
dissenting) (“[F]irst-time test refusal is a gross misdemeanor and first-time test failure is a 
misdemeanor when no aggravating factors are present.”).  
265 MINN. STAT. § 169A.03, subdiv. 12 (2019) (defining “misdemeanor”); Rosenbush, 931 
N.W.2d at 102 (“A driver who submits to a test but fails is subject to a 90-day license 
revocation if no aggravating circumstances are present.” (citing MINN. STAT. § 169A.52, 
subdiv. 4(a)(1) (2018))). 
266 MINN. STAT. § 169A.03, subdiv. 8 (2019) (defining “gross misdemeanor”); Rosenbush, 
931 N.W.2d at 103 (“[A] driver who refuses a [chemical] test is subject to a 1-year [license] 
revocation.” (citing MINN. STAT. § 169A.52, subdiv. 3(a)(1) (2018))).  
267 Rosenbush, 931 N.W.2d at 102.  
38
Mitchell Hamline Law Review, Vol. 46, Iss. 2 [2020], Art. 4
https://open.mitchellhamline.edu/mhlr/vol46/iss2/4
2020] CASE NOTE: STATE V. ROSENBUSH 405 
 
 
effort to compel the driver to take the test.”268 At a time when civil license 
revocation was the only consequence associated with test refusal, the Scott 
court stated, “[w]hen compared to the 90-day minimum revocation for 
taking but failing the test, the civil consequences strongly compel the driver 
to take the test.”269 Now, despite the increased severity of the consequences 
associated with refusal, the persuasive pressures urging compliance lose 
effect because drivers are not given full information, nor the opportunity to 
consult with counsel. The State argued that affording drivers a limited right 
to counsel in this context “implies that counsel would not only advise a 
suspect to violate the law by refusing a test, but [] also [] provide[s] the 
opportunity to advise suspects to ignore a court order.”270 That simply is not 
true. In fact, the underlying purpose of the advisory—encourage 
compliance—is actually strengthened by the presence of counsel. Lawyers 
must abide by ethical duties and obligations, one of which prohibits counsel 
from advising a client to engage in criminal or fraudulent conduct.271 Instead 
of advising drivers to refuse to comply with the search warrant, lawyers 
provide clarity regarding the severe consequences of test refusal, which may 
not be generally known by a driver. Thus, drivers are arguably more likely 
to comply with the search warrant when they are afforded complete and 
accurate information by a trusted counselor. For example, in Friedman, the 
suspected driver, confused by the advisory, requested to speak with 
counsel.272 She was informed that she could only speak to counsel after 
deciding whether she would submit.273 After refusing to submit to the 
chemical test, she called her lawyer.274 He informed her that it would be in 
                                                           
268 State v. Mike, 919 N.W.2d 103, 113 (Minn. Ct. App. 2018); see also Tyler v. Comm’r of 
Pub. Safety, 368 N.W.2d 275, 280 (Minn. 1985) (“The advisory is not designed to persuade 
a driver not to take a test; rather, it is aimed at letting a driver know the serious consequences 
of his refusal to take a test.”) (emphasis added); State v. Scott, 473 N.W.2d 375, 377 (Minn. 
Ct. App. 1991). 
269 Scott, 473 N.W.2d at 377 (“[T]he purpose of the implied consent advisory is to inform 
the driver of the serious consequences of his or her refusal. The onerous civil consequence 
of license revocation is designed to induce the driver to submit to testing. . . . When 
compared to the 90-day minimum revocation for taking but failing the test, the civil 
consequences strongly compel the driver to take the test.”). 
270 Respondent’s Brief, supra note 160, at 18. 
271 Minnesota Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.2(d) prohibits lawyers from “counsel[ing] 
a client to engage . . . in conduct that the lawyer knows is criminal . . . but a lawyer may 
discuss the legal consequences of any proposed course of conduct with a client . . . .” MINN. 
RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.2(d) (1985). 
272 Friedman v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 473 N.W.2d 828, 833 (Minn. 1991).   
273 Id.  
274 Id. 
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her best interest to submit to the chemical test.275 However, by the time she 
obtained that information from counsel, the officers had already charged 
her with refusal.276 If the purpose of the implied-consent advisory actually is 
to encourage compliance and decrease refusal rates, it would be 
advantageous to allow drivers to speak with an attorney who can explain just 
how significant the consequences of refusal are.277 
V. CONCLUSION 
The existence of the search warrant and the insufficient advisory were 
incapable of protecting Rosenbush’s rights. However, the presence of 
counsel would have ensured that Rosenbush obtained the full information 
concerning her rights, obligations, and procedures. As the court previously 
and correctly acknowledged, “[a]n attorney, not a police officer, is the 
appropriate source of legal advice. An attorney functions as an objective 
advisor who could explain the alternative choices” and the legal 
ramifications.278 Although the United States Supreme Court has recognized 
that the “foundation of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel is based on 
the traditional role of an attorney as a legal expert and strategist,”279 the 
Minnesota Supreme Court essentially replaces the role of counsel in the 
limited right to counsel context with the combination of a search warrant 
and the reading of an advisory that can be stated in a mere six words.  
 
                                                           
275 Id.  
276 Id. 
277 See, e.g., Nyflot v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 369 N.W.2d 512, 514 (Minn. 1985) (showing 
the attorney advised suspected driver to submit to the chemical test, but the police officer 
refused to let her submit because her decision to refuse was final).   
278 Friedman, 473 N.W.2d at 833.  
279 United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264, 293 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).  
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